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FOREWORD 
 
It was with pleasure that on behalf of Professor Lian Kwan Fee of the Department of 
Sociology, National University of Singapore and the School of Justice, Queensland 
University of Technology that Dr Narayanan Ganapathy and I welcomed participants to 
Singapore for a symposium on organised crime in Asia. The National University of 
Singapore was well-placed in the geographical heart of South East Asia to host such a 
conference.The symposium brought together, for the first time, law enforcement officers and 
academics from several different jurisdictions to discuss current perspectives about organised 
crime. Our theme “Organised Crime in Asia: Governance and Accountability” explored the 
relevance of such criminal activities to corruption and capture of state agencies or agents in 
the furtherance of criminal enterprises.  
 
For two days in late June 2007 nineteen distinguished speakers from several countries 
(Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, India, Australia, USA, Canada, United Kingdom, 
and Italy) spoke to the theme. The topics ranged across many of the issues involved such as 
the definition and trends in ‘organised’ crime, lethal violence, utilisation of the Internet, 
money laundering, drug and human trafficking. These proceedings offer fifteen of the papers 
presented at the meeting and in due course a selected number of these will be published in the 
Asian Journal of Criminology. The organisers are grateful to the authors and thank the 
sponsors for the support and encouragement offered. 
 
It is with regret, however, that we received the apologies of Dr. Mei Jian Ming of the Chinese 
People’s Public Security University Beijing, Chief Superintendent Choy Kin Cheung of the 
Hong Kong Police Organised Crime and Triad Bureau  and Dr Lee, Taehoon, President of the 
Korean Institute of Criminal Justice Policy. There respective operational demands prevented 
them from attending. However, Chief Superintendent Choy kindly forwarded a short 
summary of matters relevant to the organised crime situation in the Hong Kong Special 
Adminstrative Region of China. This report (prepared by Superintendent Dan Ng) is included 
along with the programme, and relevant ASEAN documents on crime in the appendices of 
these proceedings. 
 
The symposium format allowed for ample opportunity for discussion concluding with a lively 
roundtable between police and academics on the topic of evidence based research priorities. 
In the small but open forum created the challenges posed for both researchers and law 
enforcement were readily shared while research questions and mutual concerns constructively 
addressed.   
 
I need not stress to the readers of these proceedings the importance of developing effective 
counter measures against organised crime and the violence that it perpetuates. We all share 
growing concerns about the transnational nature of serious criminal networks and the 
increasing efforts made at the global and regional level by national police and multi-national 
cooperation to combat the disruptive role played by such criminal activities. We hope that 
this conference may in some small measure shed light on the difficult challenges ahead and 
contribute to a more effective research agenda. To this end I commend these proceedings and 
trust that the crucial task of reflecting and learning about the nature of organised crime 
continues with all speed. 
 
 
Professor Roderic Broadhurst,     Dr Narayanan Ganapathy 
Queensland University of Technology   Department of Sociology,  
Brisbane, Australia      National University of Singapore 
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KEY NOTE 
 
 
Into the Thick of It: Methodological Issues in Studying the Drug 
Trade in the Golden Triangle 
 
Dr Ko-lin Chin, Rutgers University-Newark 
 
When I began to contemplate a study of the drug trade in Burma, I did not give serious 
thought to asking the Burmese authorities for help in gaining access to research subjects and 
settings.  There were many reasons for this.  First of all, I did not think the Burmese 
government would allow an American professor to conduct such a study in their country, 
especially in the troublesome border areas.  Then, even if Burmese officials supported such a 
study, they would, in all probability, not let me do it on my terms; they would perhaps have 
someone from the government accompany me and monitor my work.  Knowing the mutual 
distrust that exists between people in the Wa or the Kokang and the national authorities, 
having a government official with me while conducting research would not be a plus.  More 
importantly, my past work has convinced me that I can study gang extortion (Chin 1996), 
human smuggling (Chin 1999), and the penetration of organized crime into politics (Chin 
2003) without having to rely on government authorities. 
  
I also decided that I would use an integrated research method instead of relying on one 
particular approach.  My plan was to use both traditional and extreme methods (Miller and 
Tewksbury 2001) to collect both quantitative and qualitative data from several groups of 
subjects, including opium growers, drug users, drug traders, and leaders of armed groups.  
Extreme research methods, according to Miller and Tewksbury (2001: 1): “are those that 
involve either highly unusual or creative approaches to finding answers to difficult-to-answer 
questions.  Researchers using extreme methods are thus usually thought of as individuals (or 
teams) that go about their work in ways that many other researchers would see as dangerous, 
innovative, and sometimes unethical.”  However, for safety reasons and because I do not 
speak the Wa dialect, I knew that I would not be able to conduct covert participant 
observation in the Golden Triangle with these groups of people.  As described later in this 
paper, the “extreme” part of my approach was mainly about how I gained access to the 
research settings through clandestine means and not how I hid my identity to gain access to 
the subjects.       
     
For me, the experience of conducting this study was a mixture of fun, excitement, and 
frustration.  Fun because I was able to travel to places no criminologist from the United 
States has ever before ventured to, and while there I met many interesting people, including 
various individuals from mountain tribes along the China-Burma and Thailand-Burma border.  
Exciting because I was on the move almost every day and whatever activity I was involved in, 
there was always a sinister aspect to it.  Frustrating because nothing was predictable, and 
whatever I took for granted in the United States, like taking a shower or having a cup of 
coffee, could be almost unthinkably difficult in the research locations.   
 
I will begin by discussing the process of getting in and out of the Wa Hills.        
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Getting In and Getting Out 
 
Because I was born in Burma and my enduring research interest has always been on 
transnational crime, I had been thinking since the mid-1990s about conducting a study on the 
drug trade in the Golden Triangle.  Even though I was well aware that a study of this nature 
was going to be extremely challenging, I was willing to accept the challenge.  I was very 
eager to learn more about the country where I had been born and had to leave so abruptly and 
reluctantly in the late 1960s.  No doubt, through this research project, I was looking for an 
opportunity to reacquaint myself with my past and seek to make sense of what had happened 
so many years ago.  My ability to speak the Burmese language and my familiarity with 
Burmese culture gave me the confidence that I could carry out a study like this.  Only later 
did I realize that cultural roots and language skills do not matter much in the Wa Hills; the 
area is very different from the rest of Burma, and in the hills people speak Chinese or Wa, not 
Burmese.   
 
My wife and I went to Rangoon in January 1998.  It was the city where I was born and spent 
my early childhood before leaving in 1967 when tens of thousands of Chinese were driven 
out of Burma by an anti-Chinese movement.  A friend in Taipei had arranged a long-distance 
introduction to the wife of a Kokang leader who was living in Rangoon.  I visited her in her 
new house near the Inya Lake, a pleasant neighborhood where some of the richest and most 
powerful people in Rangoon live.  During my visit, I told my hostess that I wanted to study 
the drug trade in the Kokang area.  She was naturally suspicious of me and said she was not 
sure how her husband would react to my research project.  Nevertheless, to return the favor to 
our mutual friend in Taipei, the woman was willing to arrange a trip for me in one of her cars 
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to the Kokang area where I would meet her husband.  I was tempted to go, but after 
considering how arduous it was going to be to drive from Rangoon to Laukkai (the town 
where the headquarters of Kokang is located) and the likelihood that her husband was going 
to say no to my proposed research project, I turned down the offer.  Of course, I was also 
unwilling to drag my wife through all of this.  While we were all sitting together in the living 
room, several high-ranking Burmese officials showed up to congratulate our hostess for 
moving into such a beautiful house.  As the officials arrived, our hostess quietly requested – 
if we were asked – we tell the visitors that we were from Thailand.  Fortunately, none of the 
officials bothered to ask us anything.   
 
Disappointed by this entire encounter, I left Burma somewhat dejected.  On my way back to 
the U.S. from Burma, I passed by Taipei and another friend in Taipei who knew I was 
interested in the Golden Triangle told me that a former schoolmate of ours had married a man 
who claimed to be very close to leaders of the Wa area.  Our former schoolmate’s husband, 
Mr. Lee (not his real last name), was a Taiwan-born mainland Chinese who had traveled 
extensively in the Golden Triangle to explore business opportunities.  In the process, he had 
become acquainted with leaders of various armed groups in the Shan State.  In 1997 Mr. Lee 
established a nonprofit organization to help the Wa State investigate opium-substitution crops 
and legitimate business opportunities.  I met my former schoolmate while I was in Taipei and 
she promised to help me get in touch with her husband.  Not until I returned to the United 
States was I able to reach him by telephone.  But he had good news.  He said he would be 
happy to take me to the Wa area whenever I was ready to go. 
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ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM 
 
 
East Meets West In Anti-Money Laundering And Anti-Terrorist 
Finance:  Dialogue And Differentiation On Security, The Timber 
Trade And ‘Alternative’ Banking 
 
Dr Nicholas Dorn & Professor Michael Levi, Cardiff University, UK 
 
Summary 
 
In principle, all countries support anti money laundering (AML) and anti terrorist finance 
(ATF) policies. In practice, political and economic investments and relations shape countries’ 
priorities and emphases. Looking at three fields of concern from the point of view of 
AML/ATF – logging, ‘informal’ value transfer and security, terrorism – this paper explores 
policy preferences and agenda-setting of South East Asian and European Union countries 
from the perspectives of the political and economic salience for them of these fields.   
 
 
Introduction 
 
In principle, all countries support anti money laundering (AML) and anti terrorist finance 
(ATF) policies. However there are questions to be asked about how that abstract commitment 
translates into priorities for action in relation. This paper sets up a hypothesis that, since 
AML/ATF issues can potentially arise right across the spectrum of economies and cultures, 
there is a possibility that one state may place its policy emphasis in relation to one aspect of 
the economy, whilst another favours action in another sector. What might guide the shape of 
such policy preferences, in principle and practice? The paper explores the ways in which 
political, cultural and economic differences and relations between the South East Asian and 
European regions shape their countries’ priorities in and understandings of AML and ATF. 
The paper draws upon reports from international and regional bodies, the private sector, 
NGOs, academic sources, and technical reports from international and regional bodies – 
which themselves draw upon data from the private sector, Financial Intelligence Units, law 
enforcement bodies and anti-terrorist services. The method proceeds from a sketch of 
political and economic relations between Asian countries and the European Union, as visible 
through the prism of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Different nuances in policy priorities 
are then traced through three broad economic fields in which AML and ATF are of concern: 
logging, which is of special interest to some Asian countries, although approached cautiously 
by western countries; ‘informal’ value transfer services including so-called Alternative 
Remittance Systems, where regulation seeks to exclude funds from crime and/or for 
terrorism, whilst facilitating transfer/repatriation from North to South of small amounts at 
low cost; and security, in relation to seaways, the trade in small arms, WMD proliferation and 
terrorism. The analysis illustrates how the varying emphases placed by countries and regions 
in relation to AML and ATF reflect the political and economic salience for them of the 
various substantive fields of activities in which financial flows originate.   
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Global Terror and Organised Crime1: Symbiotic or synonymous? 
 
Professor Mark Findlay, University of Sydney, Australia 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since Donald Cressey’s work on organised crime as the ‘fifth estate’ (Cressey, 1969), its 
threat to legitimate government has been identified.  Politicians and criminal justice 
administrations in Australia (and the region) for decades have chosen to represent the 
organised crime ‘menace’ as an attack on the institutions of the democratic state and as a 
physical and financial danger to society (Findlay, 1986; Findlay 2000). This is consistent 
with the approaches of governments in the United States and Italy when constructing the 
‘reality’ of the mafia in their countries for more than a century (Smith, 1975), and the 
representation of organised crime ‘colonisation’ in the transitional Eastern European states 
(Findlay. 1999).  More recently, the connection has been drawn between organised crime and 
international terrorism, with similar political purposes in mind but now the threat is to global 
governance. 
International politics declares this new age of globalisation (Baumann, 1998; Findlay 2007) is 
the major era of global terrorism (Findlay, 2003). At the same time, organised crime is now 
cast as a trans-national, cross-border problem, with alliances returning to the distinctly 
political2.  In global terrorism, the world is said to be confronting a new organised crime 
opportunity, the local manifestations of which are inextricably linked to international conflict 
and the threat is directed against global communities (Findlay, 2004).  To control terrorism 
these communities must sever the financial link with organised crime. 
However, beneath this apparent contest between organised crime and the state, are more 
complex and less apparent mutual interests at a ‘deep state’ level3.  There is significant 
evidence that both during the ‘cold war’ period, and in on-going instances of transitional state 
conflict4 alliances have been forged between organised criminal enterprise and para-political 
movements in order to destabilise state governance and thereby reap benefit5. 
This paper commences with a discussion of terrorism as the contemporary organised crime.6  
The common characteristics of terrorism and other forms of organised crime are suggested in 
a consideration of enterprise theory.  The importance of globalisation in stimulating 
organised crime as terrorism is then developed.  In this instance, globalisation negotiating 
risk and security has necessarily been pre-determined by the prevailing political concern with 
                                                 
1  This paper is not a detailed denial difference between organised crime as the aggregation of illicit wealth, and 
terrorism which may not be concerned with economic profit.  It takes as given the primary political context for 
terrorism and the enterprise environment of organised crime.  
2  This is not new.  An examination of the historical literature on the triads in Nationalist China clearly locates 
the connection between organized crime organizations and financing with contesting political movements. 
3  For a discussion of the deep state and para politics, see Tunander, 2006. 
4 Examples are provided in Reno, 2006.           
5 These benefits may have the common outcome of overturning state authority but may be motivated by 
distinctly different purposes and with often opposing eventual expectations. 
6  The link between organised crime and terrorism is not necessarily a new phenomenon.  On the contrary, the 
earliest identified manifestations of organised crime in Europe, China and even Japan demonstrated a motivation 
to undermine and overthrow established rule.  In fact, Chinese triads were, at the turn of the 19th century, bound 
up with the Nationalist struggle in China.   The difference today is that the international nature of organised 
crime as terrorism is clearly directed against global political cultures, influences and domination. 
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international terror7 . The nexus between globalisation, terrorism and organised crime is 
referred to and its consequences for countries like Australia are identified.  Australia’s 
reaction to terrorism local and global is critiqued and comment is made on the similarities in 
the way both organised crime and now terrorism (as the great threats to ‘Australian values’, 
as well as to global community) have fostered radical responses from the state.  We conclude 
by predicting how globalisation (and terrorism as one of its contemporary characteristics) is 
influencing the appreciation of organised crime in Australia and the Asian region. 
 
Throughout the paper the analysis of connections between organised 
crime/terrorism/governance is observed at both state and ‘deep state’ levels.  Regarding the 
‘deep state’, there is the recognition that there exists in the contemporary world a powerful 
clandestine relationship between the security and intelligence organisations of established 
states, international criminal networks, and ‘quasi states’ in the form of separatist movements 
or some terrorist organisations.  These ‘alternative state’ entities challenge sovereignty, 
economy, monopolies of force, and the whole protectionist fabric of the establish state.  
Organised criminal enterprise may find a home within these movements, in similar ways to 
its infiltration of state administration through corruption and black economies (Findlay, 1994; 
2004).  In the ‘deep state’ relationship the challenge of organised crime to democratic 
governance is clearest. 
 
Despite these empathies between organised crime, terrorism and state re-formation, the 
unique insight offered by the paper is to confine commonality between organised crime and 
terrorism to the level of enterprise (as distinct from any shared ideologies), while critiquing 
the link between crime financing and terror as often no more than circumstantial.  If the 
foundations of terrorist funding are not principally or essentially organised crime, then where 
and why has this assumed connection developed?  The answer may more likely lie in the way 
organised crime and terrorism have been represented by the state and its control agencies, as 
threats to democratic governance. Challenging this nexus will naturally open up other 
platforms for contesting political legitimacy through terrorism now simply dismissed as a 
consequence of criminalisation (Findlay, 2007 (b))? 
 
The first step towards these conclusions is to overview representations of organised crime 
and terrorism. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Some argue that without the strange conflation between fundamental islamists, and the neo-conservatives in 
the USA (and the terror which emerges from this) then the disengagement from conventional politics would be 
much more universal.  (See the documentary ‘The Power of Nightmares’ (SBS, 2007). 
DRUGS AND ORGANISED CRIME 
 
The Organisation of Drug Supply, South Asian Criminal Enterprise in 
the UK 
 
Professor Vincenzo Ruggiero and Research Fellow Kazim Khan, Middlesex University, UK 
 
Findings from a variety of crime surveys suggest that 12% of all 16- to 59-year olds had used 
an illegal drug in the previous year and 3% had used a Class A drug. It is estimated that while 
for white and black people the percentage is 12%, for Asians it is 5%. Individuals from a 
mixed background show the highest prevalence of drug use: 26% had taken an illicit drug in 
the previous year (Condon and Smith, 2003; Aust and Smith, 2003; Roe and Man, 2006). 
    
According to other sources, however, self-reported heroin use would indicate that rates for 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are four times higher those for withes (Ramsay and Percy, 1996). 
Of course, this should be treated with caution as such rates differ substantially from much of 
the other research. For example, Patel and Wibberley (2002) estimate that drug use in the 
Asian population is as common as in the general population of young people. This is 
particularly true for cannabis, but also for heroin and cocaine, although not for ecstasy and 
LSD.  
    
Heroin use within British South Asian (BSA) communities is documented in case-story 
studies by Akhtar and South (2000) and Carey (2000). The point is made that it would be 
naïve to assume that South Asians are less likely to engage in drug misuse because of cultural 
and religious restraints (Ganchi et al, 1997). Research also shows an increase in heroin use in 
the Bangladeshi community, where the prevalence has increased from negligible levels in the 
early 1990s to levels proportionally higher than in the white population of the same age and 
sex. Users are normally male, apparently less disadvantaged than their white counterparts, 
and have greater contacts with their non-drug-using families (White, 2001).            
    
Demand for illicit drugs among BSA communities has grown along with concerns around the 
development of organised forms of criminality within those communities. This paper 
examines the structure and modus operandi of these specific criminal organisations in the UK 
drawing on empirical research conducted between 2005 and 20061. After an overview of the 
debate on organised crime, our findings will be utilised to shape a typology, and to offer a 
variety of hypotheses around the illicit drug enterprises involved in British markets. In the 
final part of the paper, the implications for law enforcement will be discussed vis-à-vis the 
types of criminal enterprise identified.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The research project was based on face-to-face interviews with drug traffickers and distributors in custody, 
users and distributors unknown to official agencies, drug treatment staff and law enforcers based in the UK as 
well as in Pakistan. In total, the interview process involved some 150 informants.  
  8
 
Towards An Understanding Of The Dynamics Of Global 
Administrative Measures And International Criminal Courts And 
Tribunals:  A European Perspective 
 
Dr Nicholas Dorn, Cardiff University and Erasmus Rotterdam University  
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores and contrasts the dynamics of (a) international administrative measures 
and (b) international criminal courts, in terms of state interests, multilateral compromises and 
cosmopolitan challenges, drawing on the IR-inspired legal analysis of Kingsbury et al and on 
the sociology and law of Hagan et al and Loader and Walker. It compares and contrasts the 
ways in which developments in these two spheres are shaped by unstable and contingent 
dynamics between state interests, multilateral compromises/bodies, and creative and critical 
interventions by independent but cosmopolitan actors such as NGOs (adapting ideas from 
Kingsbury et al). In summary, (a) international administrative measures may take either 
'disciplinary' forms such as sanctions or 'supportive' forms such as capacity-building. 
Examples include UN sanctions against Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, 'smart' 
sanctions/targeted aid in relation to Palestine, and conditionality in UN/EU governance of the 
Balkans. In such arrangements, state interests constitute the initial drivers, transmuting into 
multilateral arrangements in a search for legitimacy, then often being discredited by 
cosmopolitan challenges on grounds of unfairness, ineffectiveness and negative side effects. 
In relation to (b) international criminal courts, the historical dynamic seems to be reversed. 
The ICTY and the International Criminal Court owed their genesis to campaigning by 
cosmopolitan networks and media (campaigns against impunity); then developed 
organisational solidity and capabilities required to function (professional and well-connected 
prosecutors); shortly attracting much closer management by states and, from some (notably 
the US), strategies for curtailment or neutralisation. In such terms is offered a comparative 
analysis of security governance.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper is concerned with two inter-twined international aspects of governance, engaging 
with administrative and criminal law in terms of the dynamics between states, international 
bodies and cosmopolitan actors. The global policy space is not just multi-level (government 
at international, regional, national and local levels, vertically differentiated) but also multi-
source (juridical interventions, private sector cooperation and hence influences, and civil 
society). We apply this perspective to aspects of international regulatory/administrative 
measures and to criminal courts and tribunals, illustrating some of the elements of 
contingency and surprise that characterise international aspects of governance.  
 
It may be helpful to start by distancing ourselves from any preconception that globalism can 
be understood as an even process, the consequences of which are uniform. That is far from 
the case, as will be shown below. Similar in some respects to the approach taken here, Burris 
et al (2005) draw on their work on international relations and local security to elaborate a 
notion of ‘nodal governance’ as highly contingent, saying that ‘Whether it produces ‘goods’ 
or ‘bads’ is an empirical and contingent question’ (Burris et al 2005: 58). We concur with this 
evaluation, even though we would quibble over ‘nodal’ language, since it may under-estimate 
the solidity, bureaucratisation and persistence of much that we see in states and international 
bodies. Nor would we adopt the more commonly used term ‘multi-level governance’ 
(Rosenau 1992, Paterson 1992, Stubbs 2995, Jessop 2006). In our view, ‘multi-level’ 
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governance has equal but opposite problems to that of ‘nodes’: it is too vertical and state-
centric a concept. The term fails to articulate the ‘horizontal’ influences in governance – 
private sector, civil society and NGOs, communications including the internet, cultural 
formations and so on.  
 
Our preferred term, multi-source governance, acknowledges influences from sovereign states 
and their federal variants, multilateral systems of implementing administrative measures and 
criminal law, and the cosmopolitan influences of the private sector and civil society. 
Sovereignty is acknowledged to be alive and kicking – as some of the examples below will 
illustrate – and has if anything been selectively strengthened by global bodies and networks 
(c.f. Picciotto 2006:1).  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, looking for conceptual tools, we review some 
sociological and legal approaches to globalisation, settling upon an approach that looks at 
synergies and contradictions between actions by states (hereafter inter-state relations), actions 
by international bodies (such as the World Bank) and cosmopolitan networks. For hints about 
the application of these concepts to current developments, we are indebted equally to 
advances in global administrative law and in the sociological study of regional and 
international criminal courts (see below). Although these traditions have trodden somewhat 
different tracks, we aim to show that they are parallel and broadly compatible approaches. 
Each in its way is a conflict and power analysis, with normative concerns around conflict-
resolution, legitimacy, negotiation and fairness. Borrowing freely from these traditions, we 
examine international governance in some of its administrative and regulatory forms – 
sanction-making by states meeting in the UN Security Council and other international fora, 
the attempted direction of countries’ social and economic policies by the World Bank and 
IMF, and current problems of (lack of) legitimisation of the actions of those bodies. In a 
broadly parallel analysis of regional and international criminal courts and tribunals, we show 
cosmopolitan, multilateral and inter-state influences around the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Finally we conclude on the challenges that multi-source governance poses both analytically 
and politically.  
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RESPONSES TO ORGANISED CRIME 
 
 
Transnationalisation, Orientalism and ‘Asian Organised Crime’ 
 
Professor James Sheptycki, York University, Toronto, Canada 
  
 
 
Finally, there comes a time when everything that men had considered as inalienable become 
an object of exchange, of traffic and could be alienated.  This is the time when the very things 
which till then had been communicated, but never exchanged; given but never sold; acquired, 
but never bought – virtue, love conviction, knowledge, conscience, etc. – when everything 
finally passed into commerce.  It is the time of general corruption, of universal venatility, or, 
to speak in terms of political economy, the time when everything moral or physical, having 
become a marketable value, is brought to the market to be assessed at its truest value.  (Karl 
Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The question arises, are Western criminologists equipped to theorize Asian Organized Crime?  
The gulf between east and west is wide and, ever since Edward Said’s influential work 
Orientalism (1979), this barrier has been seen as problematic, perhaps especially for 
criminologists (Cain, 2000).  In this paper I want to problematise the relationship between 
Orientalism and transnationalisation and will do so by interrogating the trope of Asian 
Organised Crime.  There are dangers if the notion of Orientalism helps to maintain stale 
debates about human rights and cultural relativism which most progressive criminologists 
would probably want to steer clear of.  On the other hand, an abstraction like Asian 
Organised Crime is ripe for deconstruction and criminologists attuned to the politics of their 
discipline would, for the most part, accept the urge to pull apart such a concept.  However, 
this kind of theoretical move equates with a relativistic epistemological orientation which is 
usually understood to be antithetical to a philosophical position upholding the notion of 
human rights.  As can be seen from the outset, the notion of Asian Organized Crime (AOC) 
raises complex questions and, as such, offers a crucial acid test for positioning criminological 
theory between the universalism of human rights and the particularism of cultural relativism.  
This is theoretically challenging but, in a world that has gone transnational, these issues are 
not merely academic.  The practical outcome of this positioning has implications for the 
character of what is here loosely termed the ‘global system’. 
 
 
  11
 
Inclusive National Governance and Trafficked Women in Australia: 
Otherness and Local Demand 
 
Dr Rebecca La Forgia and Dr Marinella Marmo, Flinders University, Australia 
 
Trafficked women are used and consumed in different ways and by different users in 
Australia.  They are used by the traffickers and by the consumer of the destination country.  
They are used as prosecutorial tools by the national criminal justice agents.  They are used 
by the national politicians to pursue border control policy objectives and to be seen as 
abiding by international protocols.  In all these uses, the identity of the trafficked woman is 
formed and shaped to fit the users’ need.  However, these women’s otherness and abjection is 
constantly maintained and reinforced.  They are used as a commodity.  Meanwhile, the 
discussion on the demand side, and the consequent responsibility of the destination country, 
is virtually omitted.  
 
This paper will raise the question of how the socio-legal analysis and discourse would evolve 
if a literal interpretation of trafficking women as commodity was taken into account, 
exploring an international trade approach.  The social construction of trafficked women as a 
commodity has been identified and criticised by academic scholars, NGOs’ and UN’s 
rapporteurs.  By pursuing this line of approach, the destination country is forced to take 
more responsibility for how the woman is demanded within its territory. As a consequence of 
this international trade approach, the State should deliver equality and non-discrimination. 
Rather than being a cynical application of a trade framework to trafficked women, this 
approach aims to highlight the paradox of such a situation in legal terms.  It is highlighted 
that approaching trafficked women from this legal and jurisprudential way may offer more 
possibilities to expand their claims against the State.  Currently, in Australia, when a 
trafficked woman is located by the State, she would attract limited and temporal rights, her 
being the ‘other’ as well as an abject entity remains, notwithstanding the fact the she was 
imported because there is a demand within the territory.   
 
The human rights approach and discourse fail women (Irigaray 1985).  This is evident in the 
case of trafficked women for sexual servitude.  In Australia, trafficked women are portrayed 
and maintained as the ‘other’, as unbelonging matter of the moral and legal community.  
Trafficked women are dealt with as an external issue – to the point that their conditions and 
situation are unable to affect domestic policy objectives.  Their status as irregular immigrant 
is used to re-establish a social and moral order, a social identity of the Australian system, 
which is disturbed by the unwanted presence of trafficked women (Dauvergne 2004).  In this 
context, the socio-political construction of legality internalises a sense of belonging and of 
citizenship (Bauman 2000).   
  
The portrayal of trafficked woman as external to Australia’s domestic issues is   
manufactured and contrived.  In fact, there is a clear connection between the trafficked 
woman and the internal community.  These women are present in Australia due to an existing 
domestic demand (Fergus 2005); there is an internal market that requires and consumes their 
sexual services.  This connection between trafficked women and the domestic market has 
mostly been disregarded by national policy makers, and consequently has been overlooked 
and under-researched. This is why, for example, Costa, the Executive Director of UN Office 
on Drugs and Crime, emphasises the importance of focusing on the demand side of 
trafficking as well as other strategies and approaches (2006 United Nations Report on 
Trafficking in Persons, hereafter 2006 UN Report). 
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This paper argues that an international trade approach may contribute to the analysis of the 
problem of trafficking in women through a different lens.  This proposal of approaching 
trafficking in women using various lenses has been already explored (Munro 2006, Bruch 
2004).  We aim to continue this investigative-process and to offer a further interdisciplinary 
approach.  The twin international trade themes of the consumers’ role in characterising 
‘likeness’ and the State responsibility for equality of treatment is explored in the context of 
trafficked women.  It is argued that consumers of trafficked women demand them in their 
gendered capacity.  As a consequence, consumers establish a fixed identity of these women 
as ‘women’ within the Australian community.  The trafficked women are therefore not the 
‘other’, but are ‘like’ and equal to national women.  Accordingly, the State has a 
corresponding duty to treat them as equals, regardless of nationality or origin.   
 
Therefore, and controversially, if trafficked women are used and consumed as a commodity 
through an international trade legal analysis, these women should acquire a stable identity.  
While it is extremely confrontational, as well as socially, politically and ethically problematic 
to use the language of commodification in relation to any person, the reality is that a human 
rights’ approach has failed these women.  Even the most inappropriate approach may offer 
more real protection than abstract rights.  This approach is even more purposeful in the 
Australian context, where a national human rights bill is still a vague notion than a realistic 
proposition.  
   
Focusing on this demand side of trafficking, whereby the trafficked women’s connection with 
the domestic market is stressed, challenges several socio-political objectives.  According to 
the mainstream political narrative, once the crime of trafficking in women is cleaned up, the 
Australian Government has achieved a number of policy objectives, including its safety aims 
and its border protection goal.  Moreover, the Government, while accessing international 
consensus and abiding by international protocols, has sheltered the internal moral 
community.  In doing so, the community does not face a confronting reality: these women are 
imported because there is a demand in Australia.  It is therefore the argument of this paper 
that the destination country’s market can, when properly analysed, provide a useful lens 
through which to consider the role of the demander.  
 
The above discussion is achieved dividing the paper into three sections.  In the first section, 
the recent Australian legal framework is introduced.  It is argued that trafficked women’s 
status of ‘other’ and ‘abject’ (Kristeva 1982) remains.  In the second section, the international 
trade approach is explained and applied to trafficking in women.  It is emphasised how 
Australia should acquire more responsibility towards these women, because of the demand in 
the destination country.  In the third section, demand is contextualised in broader terms, to 
include the public as consumer of information.  By informing the public of the problem of 
trafficking in women in Australia, the public could demand a better-targeted and more 
diversified approach.   
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TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANIZED CRIME 
 
 
The Internet, Technology, and Organised Crime 
 
Professor Peter Grabosky, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia 
 
 
Abstract 
Digital technology has transformed organizational life. Developments in communications, 
and in information storage and retrieval, to name just two areas, have greatly enhanced the 
efficiency with which legitimate organizations operate. Unfortunately, the benefits of digital 
technology are not lost on criminal organizations, which exploit digital technology to 
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of their own operations.  
 
This paper will discuss the organized criminal exploitation of digital technology, by looking 
at a number of illustrative cases from Asia and around the world. It will discuss the various 
types of “conventional” organized crime that can be facilitated by digital technology, as well 
as terrorism, which itself can be regarded as a special kind of organized criminal activity. 
One fundamental question that the paper will seek to address is whether the activities of 
Asian organized crime have become substantively different as a result of technology, or 
whether traditional organized criminal activities in Asia are merely being conducted on a 
more efficient and effective basis. The paper will note the transnational nature of much 
organized criminal activity, and will discuss mechanisms for the control of organized crime 
in the digital age. 
 
I.  Introduction 
When scholars and law enforcement officials think of organized crime, they instinctively 
think about stereotypical organizations committing certain types of crime. The classic 
monolithic, pyramidal organization such as the Yakuza, triads, or the Italian mafia, engaged 
in extortion or in the delivery of illicit services, come immediately to mind. 
 
However, the nature of organizational life is changing, for criminal organizations no less than 
for legitimate ones.  Monolithic, hierarchical, formal organizations still exist, but 
organizational form is becoming increasingly diverse. So too are the activities that criminal 
organizations engage in. To a significant extent, these trends are both the products of rapid 
developments in information and communications technology. 
 
This article looks at the exploitation of digital technology in furtherance of organized crime. 
It first addresses the concept of criminal organization, and suggests the desirability of a more 
expansive construction, to accommodate the evolution and diversification of organizational 
forms in the modern era. It then looks at various types of high tech crime that have been 
committed by organizations, with particular reference to those operating in Asia. It concludes 
with a few suggestions for the prevention and control of organized crime in the digital age. 
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Criminal exploitation of online systems by organised crime groups 
 
Dr Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo and Russell G Smith, Australian Institute of Criminology , 
Canberra ,Australia 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article considers how information and communications technologies (ICT) can be used 
by organised crime groups to infringe legal and regulatory controls. Three categories of 
groups are identified: traditional organised criminal groups which make use of ICT to 
enhance their terrestrial criminal activities; organised cybercriminal groups which operate 
exclusively online; and organised groups of ideologically and politically motivated 
individuals who make use of ICT to facilitate their criminal conduct. The activities of each 
group are then assessed in relation to five areas of risk: the use of online payment systems, 
online auctions, online gaming, social networking sites and blogs. It is concluded that the 
distinction between traditional organised crime groups and the other two groups – 
cybercriminal groups and ideologically / politically motivated cyber groups – is converging, 
with financially-motivated attacks becoming more targeted. Legislation will need to adapt to 
deal with new technological developments and threats that organised criminals seek to exploit. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Digital content (or electronically stored information) can be broadly defined as information or 
data extracted from a computer or other electronic storage medium (Standards Australia 
International 2003). A 2003 study reported that information is increasingly being stored or 
archived in electronic form – approximately 92 percent of data were created in electronic-
only form, particularly on hard disks (Lyman & Varian 2003). Another report (Gantz et al. 
2007) indicated that the amount of digital information created, captured and replicated in 
2006 was approximately 161 billion gigabytes or to put this into perspective, the equivalent 
of 230 billion standard 700-megabyte CDs or 37 billion standard 4.3-gigabyte DVDs.  
 
Broadband connection, technological innovations and declining prices of electronic data 
storage devices continue to lower entry barriers for digitisation of information which will 
continue to have a wide-ranging influence on how the banking and finance industry operates. 
This includes customer service (e.g. electronic payment systems) and business operations (e.g. 
electronic clearing).  
 
The declining importance of dial-up connections and the expansion of broadband services 
have also created an environment in which connections are maintained continually. 
Investment in network expansion by telecommunications companies will see a further 
expansion in capacity that will result in an increase in bandwidth availability and greater 
adoption of wireless and mobile technologies. Although Asia represents about 56.5 percent of 
the world population, only about 10.7 percent of its population has access to the internet as of 
March 2007 (World internet usage and population statistics 2007). This, however, represents 
just over one-third of the world’s current population with access to the internet and is thus a 
highly significant market. In addition, although English remains the dominant language, 
Asian languages (i.e. Chinese, Japanese and Korean) constitute at least 25 percent of online 
use as described in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Top ten languages used in the web  
Top ten 
languages in 
the internet 
% of all  
internet 
users 
Number of 
internet users 
by language 
Internet 
penetration 
& by 
language 
Internet 
growth % 
for language 
(2000 - 
2007 ) 
2007 estimate 
world 
population 
for the 
language 
English 30 328,666,386 29 140 1,143,218,916 
Chinese 14 159,001,513 12 392 1,351,737,925 
Spanish 8 88,920,232 20 260 439,284,783 
Japanese 8 86,300,000 67 83 128,646,345 
German 5 58,711,687  61 113 96,025,053 
French 5 55,521,294 14 355 387,820,873 
Portuguese 4 40,216,760 17 431 234,099,347 
Korean 3 34,120,000 46 79 74,811,368 
Italian 3 30,763,940  52 133 59,546,696 
Arabic 3 28,540,700 8 932 340,548,157 
Top ten 
languages 82 910,762,512 21 181 4,255,739,462 
Rest of 
World 
Languages 
 
18 203,511,914 9 445 2,318,926,955 
World total 100 1,114,274,426  17 209 6,574,666,417 
Note: Internet usage and world population statistics at 10 March 2007. 
Source: adapted from http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats7.htm  
 
As businesses continue to engage in electronic commerce, they will become increasingly 
globalised and interconnected. In Australia, a considerable increase in electronic banking has 
been observed (APCA 2005). This is perhaps due to the cost of an internet-based transaction 
being a small fraction of a ‘bricks-and-mortar’ based transaction. The propensity for 
consumers to buy online is indicated in a recent report that online spending on retail websites 
in United States has exceeded US$100 billion (Ames 2007).  
 
Ease in accessing and sharing content electronically offers governments and businesses the 
opportunity to engage the public online and to bridge the gap between sectors. The emerging 
trend of individuals using the internet to access public-domain services in preference to more 
traditional offline modes will increase the popularity of digital content in e-commerce, e-
government and social activities such as e-tendering, e-voting and e-reporting.  
 
With the ease of accessing and sharing content electronically, the key issue to consider in this 
article is whether crime follows opportunity, particularly criminal exploitation of online 
auctions, payment systems, gaming, social networking sites and blogs? Section 2 of this 
article briefly discusses three categories of organised crime groups. Sections 3 to 7 examine 
the risks associated with online payment, auctions, gaming, social networking sites and blogs 
(e.g. how can these be exploited by organised crime groups to ‘develop’ new crimes and 
‘cleverly transform’ traditional crimes). Examples of ‘cleverly transformed’ traditional 
crimes include abusing online payment systems to facilitate money laundering activities and 
using the internet as a distributor of computer-based images of child abuse and child 
pornography due to the ability to broadcast video coverage of sexual abuse in real time. 
Section 8 concludes this article. 
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COUNTRY PAPERS 
 
 
China’s Implementation of the United Nations Convention against  
Transnational Organized Crime 
 
Dr Margaret K. Lewis, New York University, USA 
 
 
After a quarter century of efforts by the United Nations to strengthen international 
cooperation in the fight against organized crime, 124 member states signed the landmark 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) in December 
2000 (U.N. 2000).1  The People’s Republic of China (the P.R.C. or China) was an early and 
enthusiastic proponent.  China is an original signatory, and its legislature unanimously voted 
to ratify UNTOC in August 2003.2  UNTOC entered into force on September 29, 2003, after 
forty states became parties (State Parties).  Seven years since signing and four years into its 
implementation, how well is China living up to the terms and spirit of UNTOC?  The answer 
is quite well.  Despite lingering discrepancies, China’s laws are substantially in compliance 
with UNTOC’s requirements.  Beyond the black letter law, China has made an earnest, good 
faith effort to embrace greater international cooperation to combat transnational3 organized 
crime.   
 
Concerns about organized crime are partially driving China’s legal-reform efforts.  Gangsters 
have certainly played a role in Chinese history—such as Chiang Kai-shek’s membership in 
Shanghai’s “Green Gang” (Huston 1995)—and they remain active today.  In a speech leading 
up to the 2001 “strike hard” campaign, President Jiang Zemin named crimes committed by 
organized criminal groups as one of the campaign’s three focuses (Trevaskes 2002).4  One 
                                                 
1 As of April 2007, UNTOC had 147 signatories and 132 parties.  Although the press release from the signing 
describes UNTOC as the product of 25 years of work, concrete drafting of UNTOC followed the 1994 decision 
of the General Assembly to approve the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized 
Transnational Crime (U.N. General Assembly 2000). 
2 The announcement is contained in the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
on Approving UNTOC, dated August 27, 2003.  UNTOC took effect in the Macao Special Administrative 
Region on the same date.  China later extended UNTOC’s application to Hong Kong on September 7, 2006, in 
the Official Reply of the State Council concerning the Decision to Use UNTOC in the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (国务院关于决定《联合国打击跨国有组织犯罪公约》适用于香港特别行政区的批
复).  China has not signed the two protocols that were originally issued with UNTOC:  the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and the Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea.  However, China has signed but not ratified the Protocol against 
the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, which 
entered into force in 2005. 
3 An offence is considered “transnational” under UNTOC if  “(a) it is committed in more than one State; (b) It is 
committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in 
another State; (c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal 
activities in more than one State; or (d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State” 
(art. 3, para. 2). 
4 In the post-Mao era, China has mounted three wide-scale “yanda” () campaigns—commonly translated as 
“strike hard” or “stern blows” campaigns—in 1983-86, 1996, and 2001, respectively.  In his account of the 
1983-86 campaign, Murray Scot Tanner describes the Chinese Communist Party Politburo’s August 1983 
“Central Committee Directive on Sternly Attacking Criminal Activities,” which identified “’hooligan’ gang 
members” as one of “seven types of people” who would be principal objects of the campaign (Tanner 2000).  
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Chinese academic estimated in 2000 that China had a minimum of one million members of 
“heishehui” (黑社会) (Sina.com 2000), which is varyingly translated as black societies, 
secret societies, criminal underworld, and mafia.  The 2001 campaign was fierce, but it did 
not eradicate organized crime.5  For example, in 2006, P.R.C. authorities indicted 34 suspects 
in Beijing on charges stemming from their involvement with the Hu brothers, described by 
one reporter as “China’s ‘Sopranos’” (Coonan 2006).  And the media recently circulated 
photos of limousines and armored vehicles that were driven around Hebei Province by Yang 
Shukuan, chairman of a corporate group and reported crime boss (Wang 2007). 
 
There is also considerable literature on Chinese crime groups that operate abroad.  For 
example, in their article “Asian Emerging Crime Groups: Examining the Definition of 
Organized Crime,” John Huey-Long Song and John Dombrink describe four types of Chinese 
entities that operate in the United States:6  triads,7 tongs,8 street gangs, and heroin smuggling 
operations9 (Song & Dombrink 1994).  Yet many of these ethnically Chinese groups do not 
have ties to Mainland China.  Furthermore, comments by P.R.C. officials downplay the 
current involvement of Mainland groups in cross-border organized crime.  One official in 
                                                                                                                                                        
For the 1996 campaign, the phrasing was modified into “organized crime of a secret-society nature” (Chen 
2005). 
5 The efficacy of such short-term, vigorous anti-crime campaigns is an issue of debate.  In her article, “Courts on 
the Campaign Path in China: Criminal Court Work in the ‘Yanda 2001’ Anti-Crime Campaign,” Susan 
Trevaskes opines, “Like the first Yanda campaign from 1983 to 1986, crime figures will fall in the short term 
after 2001, and will then rise dramatically after Yanda 2001 concludes, at whatever date in the future.  This is 
because Yanda is ineffective in controlling broad crime trends such as the increase in gang-related crime” 
(Trevaskes 2002).  Similarly, Murray Scot Tanner writes of the 1983-86 campaign, “Evidence about the 
unsustainability of the improvements in public order greatly undermined Liu Fuzhi’s [then Minister of Public 
Security] contention that the campaign had restored criminals’ fear of the Party in any lasting way, and 
suggested that as a method of social control, campaign-style policing had only short-term efficacy”  (Tanner 
2000).  Tanner and Trevaskes both attribute such campaigns more to a show of state strength—and the survival 
of the Communist Party—than to effective crime control (Trevaskes 2002; Tanner 2000).  The Chinese 
government has recently indicated a move away from “strike hard” campaigns.  Citing the calls for “balancing 
severe punishment with leniency” in the 2006 annual work reports of the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate, a March 2007 article from the Party mouthpiece “People’s Daily Online” declares, 
“China rejects ‘strike hard’ anti-crime policy for more balanced approach” (People’s Daily 2007). 
6 For example, in a 2004 press release regarding “Operation Panda,” U.S. officials “announced indictments 
targeting two powerful Chinese organized criminal groups that had been operating in New York City” (U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2004). 
7 Perhaps the most notorious of Chinese organized crime entities is the triad, a type of secret society that arose in 
the seventeenth century in opposition to the Qing Dynasty (Library of Congress 2003).  Generally based in 
southern China—with the focal point being Hong Kong—triads have expanded their activities overseas.  Their 
Mainland activities are also reportedly on the rise, a move that has been eased by official corruption:  “It’s not 
necessarily because they are triads but because they have the capital, they have the experience of running 
entertainment businesses, drugs and women, for instance, and can be of use to local mainland criminal 
entrepreneurs” (Fraser 2002 (quoting criminologist Chu Yiu-kong, assistant professor at the University of Hong 
Kong’s Department of Sociology)). 
8 The term “tong” (“dang” in pinyin) is sometimes connected with criminal organizations, but in its literal form, 
the word simply refers to an organized group, including political parties.  For the purposes of his book titled 
“Tongs, Gangs and Triads,” Peter Huston writes, “[Tong] is defined as an organization that consists primarily of 
unrelated Chinese people united to assist one another by a bond that includes secret ceremonies and oaths.  This 
definition encompasses many things, but then again, there are a lot of different kinds of tongs” (Huston 1995).   
9 In May 2003, a Mainland-based Hong Kong resident was arrested on charges of smuggling U.S. $100 million 
of heroin into the United States.  U.S. and P.R.C. law enforcement cooperated closely in the investigation, so 
closely that, “[a]t one point, a multinational group of officers huddled in a hotel room for 10 hours, speaking 
Cantonese, Mandarin, Fukienese and English as they plotted strategy, a U.S. official said” (Pomfret 2003a, 
2003b).  Dozens of other suspects were arrested by drug agents in the United States, Canada, and India in 
connection with the drug smuggling ring, known as the “125 Organization”—a derivative of the leader’s 
nickname that referred to his 125-kilogram (275-pound) weight (Pomfret 2003a).  
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Beijing told researchers that China does not yet have “black societies,” and other groups10 
have not reached the requisite level of sophistication to extend overseas:  “[B]ecause these 
groups are all territorial—their spheres of influence and their activities are restricted to their 
own turfs.  They are not mature enough to establish a transnational crime network” 
(Finckenauer & Chin 2007).  In his 2005 article “Secret Societies and Organized Crime in 
Contemporary China,” An Chen of the National University of Singapore seconds this 
assessment:  “In today’s China nearly all criminal gangs are local ones” (Chen 2005). 
 
Accordingly, although recognizing the domestic presence of at least nascent organized crime 
and concerns about its expansion overseas, China’s legal reforms since signing UNTOC are 
not driven solely by a fear of organized crime, let alone transnational organized crime.  
Rather, China’s legislative reforms are better understood in light of a greater driving force, 
namely, the Chinese government’s more pressing, overarching goal of combating financial 
crime, both domestic and transnational, whether or not organized crime is involved.  The 
legislation called for by UNTOC has a broader advantageous impact on the fight against 
financial crime.  Indeed, the most notorious Chinese actors involved in transnational money 
laundering, corruption, and other offenses addressed under UNTOC do not fit the traditional 
mold of organized crime figures.  They are more suited for the cubicle-dwelling inhabitants 
of “The Office” than the slick gangsters of the “The Sopranos.”  This is graphically illustrated 
by the former Bank of China managers who are facing racketeering, money laundering, and 
fraud charges in the United States stemming from a complex plan to defraud the bank of a 
reported U.S. $485 million.11  The managers carried out the scheme in southern China by 
quietly issuing bogus loans to local companies and moving diverted funds overseas via 
creative accounting, not by using violence or the threat thereof as is commonly associated 
with organized crime.  Now China wants them back.12  These managers are hardly unique in 
their decision to take criminal proceeds and flee overseas:  The official Xinhua News Agency 
quoted a P.R.C. Ministry of Commerce statement in 2006 that “4,000-strong fleeing officials 
took away more than 50 billion U.S. dollars, few of which have been recovered” (Xinhua 
2006a). 
 
This paper reviews China’s compliance with UNTOC’s requirements concerning domestic 
criminal law and concludes that current P.R.C. law is substantially in conformity with 
UNTOC, though further legislative action is necessary to achieve full compliance.  Looking 
beyond the law on the books, China continues to be a staunch supporter of international 
cooperation, as called for by UNTOC.  China’s legal reform efforts are better understood, 
however, as part of its larger push to crackdown on financial crime than as a freestanding 
attack on organized crime. 
 
                                                 
10 The other groups identified by the official are criminal groups, criminal organizations, and black society-like 
criminal organizations (Finckenauer & Chin 2007).  Although the report does not use the Chinese names of 
these organizations, they are presumably “fanzui jituan” (犯罪集团), “fanzui zuzhi” (犯罪组织), and “heishehui 
xingzhi zuzhi” (黑社会性质组织), respectively.  In this paper, “black society-like criminal organizations” is 
translated as “organizations in the nature of a criminal syndicate.” 
11 The charges are laid out in the Second Superseding Indictment, issued by the U.S. District Court, District of 
Nevada, on January 31, 2006 (U.S. District Court, District of Nevada 2006).   
12 Another participant returned to China where he was convicted on embezzlement and related charges.  If the 
others return to China, they are expected to face similar charges. 
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Organized Crime In The City Of Chennai 
 
Professor R. Thilagaraj, University of Madras, Chennai &  C.K. Gandhirajan, I.P.S., 
Commissioner of Police, Coimbatore, Tamil nadu 
 
Abstract 
In the recent past there has been a spurt in the activities of criminal gangs in and around the 
city of Chennai.  The fear of crime victimization by these gangs has created a feeling of 
insecurity in  the neighborhoods of the city.  Frequent killings, kidnappings, theft, robbery, 
dacoity by organized criminal gangs and organized frauds by the non banking financial 
institutions victimized a large number of people.  An attempt has been made in this study to 
understand the structure, modus operandi and characteristics of the gangs and gang members. 
The study also focused on measures of the government to prevent and control activities of 
these gangs.  Through case study method 20 mercenary gangs, 20 robbery gangs and seven 
financial fraud gangs were studied.   
 
Organized Crime In The City Of Chennai  
The increasing trend of organized crime by criminal gangs particularly in the metropolitan 
cities poses a new challenge to the law enforcement authorities.  The distinct trend in 
organized crime is the result of the new markets provided by the liberalization and 
globalization of the financial markets, developments in communication technology and 
corrupt politics (Ghosh, S.K. 1991, Alexander, P.J. 200 and, Castells, M, 2001).  In order to 
exploit this favourable situations criminals acquire expertise and join together with other such 
criminal gangs and operate in an organized way (Kulkarni, R.S. 1991 and Verma 2000).   
 
The Chennai city, one of the big cities in South India experienced a sudden spurt in the 
activities of the organized criminal gangs.  Frequent kidnappings and killings by mercenary 
gangs, theft, robbery and dacoity by these gangs in an organized way were reported 
frequently.  This apart crimes by financial institutions had victimized a large number of 
people who deposited money in them.  The present study has made an attempt to understand 
the organizational structure and function of the organized crime gangs, characteristics of the 
gang members and measures taken to control the criminal activities of these organized 
criminal gangs.  In the present study organized crime means a congregation of two or more 
people in planning, organizing and executing a criminal act for illegal practice and also 
having network with other criminal gangs, politicians, law enforcement agencies and other 
officials for continuing illegal enterprise.  This small group of organized criminals is known 
as criminal gang in the context of the present study and such gangs involve in all criminal 
activities.   
 
Research Method 
In the present study, case study method which is a popular form of qualitative analysis and 
involves a careful and a complete observation of a social unit, be that a person, a group or 
even a community is used. As there is no significant difference among the gangs of each 
category of crime, the data obtained from the gangs under each category are clubbed together 
as one unit or a case for the analysis purpose. Secondary data were gathered through the 
records of the police stations and each criminal gang was thoroughly examined.  The 
organizational structure, administration, role of the leader and other members of the gang, 
role of the sub divisions of the gangs engaged in various activities, patrons, code of conduct 
of the gang and modus operandi of these gangs were studied in detail.  Also, the 
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characteristics of members of the gang, their behaviour, their socio economic background of 
the family and role in the gang were analysed.  The police officers who have dealt with these 
gangs and also few gang members were interviewed personally to substantiate with the 
findings from the documents collected from the police stations. The results of data obtained 
about 20 mercenary gangs, 20 robbery gangs and 7 financial fraud gangs were analysed and 
the results are discussed.  
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State Intervention and Social Change: An Account for the Decline of 
Triad Society in Hong Kong in post-1997 Era. 
 
Dr. Lee King Wa, Centre for Criminology, University of Hong Kong 
 
Abstract: 
This paper draws on Amos H. Hawley’s seminal theory of community structure to interpret 
various factors that might lead to the decline of Chinese triad societies after People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) resumed its sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997. Two sociological 
concepts, symbiosis and commensalisms, were adapted from Hawley’s work to explain the 
role of and competition between triad societies in organized crime networks. Formed initially 
as mutual-aided groups to compete for labor market, triad societies continued thriving by 
symbiotically functioned in other corporate-alike illegitimate or legitimate businesses. At 
interlocking point of categoric group and corporate group are profitable niches which triad 
gangs violently compete for and that come to most attentions. This paper then argues that the 
pro-active state intervention at these profitable niches has furthered the decline of triads in 
post 1997 era, but we further point out regional economic development and change of 
population structure might also have weakened the influence of triad subculture at its root.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
A recent news article of an interview with a senior Hong Kong Police (Ming Pao, 2007-04-13) 
has revealed the local authority has recognized a decline of triad societies since People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) resumed its sovereignty over Hong Kong (HK) in 1997. The 
present paper agrees with the official stance that a pro-active state intervention in the post-
1997 era speeds up triad’s decline, but further points out other social changes such as 
population structure and economy might have contributed as well. This paper starts with a 
rebuttal that triad societies are not Chinese Mafia, for a review of literature showed that the 
monolithic view of US Mafia was itself misleading. Indeed, studies of organized crimes 
revealed them to be a series of networks (Albini, 1971; Reuter & Rubinstein, 1978; 
Chambliss, 1978, 1999; Anderson, 1979; Mastrofski & Potter, 1986), a spectrum of 
enterprises (Smith, 1971, 1980), or a functional group in a social system (Landesco, 1929; 
Ianni, 1971; Ianni & Ianni, 1972; Mak, 1981; Lyman & Potter, 2000).  
 
We then adapt the concept of symbiosis and commensalisms (Hawley, 1950) to explain the 
nexus of triad gangs and organized crimes. Originated from a violent subculture of gang 
competition for labor market at the end of 19th Centuries (Morgan, 1960), the categorically 
structured triad societies thrived by symbiotically serving a niche in both the legitimate and 
illegitimate corporate-alike businesses in HK (Chin, 1995; Chu, 1996, 2000), Southeast Asia 
(Mak, 1981) and overseas (Chin, 1990b, 1996). Five types of triad related violence exist 
around these interlocking categoric and corporate relationships. The final part of the paper 
discusses to what extent state intervention at these profitable niches, such as the legislation of 
Organized and Serious Crime Ordinance (OSCO), and change in population structure or 
regional economy might impact on the development of triad in HK.  
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Recent Trends of Organized Crime around Japan and (South) East 
Asia 
 
Professor Noriyoshi Takemura, Toin University of Yokohama, Japan 
 
 
Part 1: Recent Trends and Contour of Organized Crime in Japan 
 
1. Overview of Organized Crime 
 
1.1 Trends in Organized Crime 
1. Boryokudan gangs further diversified their fundraising activities while concealing the true 
nature of their organizational structures and obscuring their type of activities. The three 
major groups, particularly the Yamaguchi-gumi, increased their dominance of the 
organized crime scene. 
2. Arrests in methamphetamine cases increased for the first time in five years. More than 
half of them were members of boryokudan. Seizures of MDMA and cannabis recorded 
the highest and the second highest, respectively. 
3. Gun-shooting cases hit a record low. Boryokudan members were involved in 67.1% of 
the cases. Police successfully raided 11 arms caches belonging to them. 
4. 2005 saw a record number of cases involving visiting foreigners. Non-Japanese crime 
groups aided and abetted illegal aliens in committing various offenses. These groups 
interacted with boryokudan gangs through cooperation and confrontation. 
 
1.2 Organized Crime Groups (Boryokudan) 
Active membership in the Boryokudan peaked in 1963, with approximately 184,100 
members. Since then, active membership was on a steady decline until 1987 when it once 
again started showing signs of growth. With the implementation of the 1992 Law Concerning 
Prevention of Unjust Acts by Boryokudan (Anti-Boryokudan Law), this growth trend was 
halted and the number of Boryokudan members began to decline. However, the last few years 
has once again shown an increase in numbers. As of the end of 2005, Boryokudan 
membership stands at about 86,300, with 43,300 full members and 43,000 associates. 
 (Note: Boryokudan – antisocial groups indigenous to Japan – are commonly referred to as 
"Yakuza" and are defined by Law as "any organization likely to facilitate its members to 
collectively or habitu-ally commit illegal acts of violence") 
 
1.2.1 Major Groups 
The three major Boryokudan groups are: Yamaguchi-gumi, Sumiyoshi-kai and Inagawa-kai. 
As of 2005, membership within these three groups numbered approximately 33,300, 
representing more than 76% of all full status Boryokudan members. 
 
1.2.2 Intervention in Civil Affairs and Company Transactions 
Boryokudan groups pose an enormous threat to civil affairs and corporate transactions. They 
are causing felonious crimes using firearms in turf wars. They are also committing a variety 
of crimes to raise funds by invading the legiti-mate business community and pre-tending to 
be engaged in legitimate business deals. They do this either through companies, etc. which 
they are involved in managing or in cooperation with other companies. 
 
1.3 Change in Trends of Boryokudan 
 
1.3.1 Diversification and Obscuration in Transparency of the Boryokudan Fundraising 
Activities 
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The methods of Boryokudan in raising funds are diversifying and increasing in obscurity. In 
recent years, out of the total arrests of the Boryokudan regular and associate members, the 
number of arrests for their traditional moneymaking businesses such as gambling and drug 
trafficking has decreased in ratio, while the ratio of arrests of financial and bad-loan related 
offences and fundraising offences under the guise of regular business activities has increased.  
Analysis on criminal cases committed by Boryokudan, shows that Boryokudan are 
committing a variety of fundraising offences such as the abuse of the public benefit plan, wire 
transfer through impostor and disguise frauds, robberies, and larcenies, in accordance with 
the changing social situations. 
 
1.3.2 Internationalization of Boryokudan 
Boryokudan groups have extended their operations abroad. Not only are they smuggling guns 
and drugs, but they also act as brokers for alien smuggling. The police are strengthening 
investigative cooperation and information exchange with overseas law enforcement agencies 
to determine how the Boryokudan are expanding their operations overseas and to what extent 
they are in cooperation or conflict with foreign organized crime groups in Japan. 
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Kidnap For Ransom In South East Asia: The Case for a Regional 
Recording Standard 
 
Mohd Kassim Noor Mohamed∗ 
Kidnapping for ransom is not a new phenomenon. According to Control Risk Group, an 
international risk consultancy, kidnappings of foreign nationals globally, have increased 
275% over the past 10 years. High profile incidents such as the tourist kidnappings in 2000 
by the Abu Sayyaf group, operating out of the troubled southern region of the Philippines, 
show that South East Asia has its own regionalised kidnapping hotspots. It is suspected that 
a high proportion of kidnappings are perpetrated by organised economic or political crime 
groups but it is not possible to estimate with any degree of accuracy what percentage can 
be attributed to organised crime.  This article will provide an overview of the problem, 
drawing upon existing literature available in the public domain. There will be a typological 
discussion to show the critical differences between the various categories of kidnapping. 
The reliability of existing statistics, categorisation and recording of kidnapping for ransom 
will also be scrutinised, in particular for their variability across the region, to see whether 
this presents a barrier to a better understanding of the size and seriousness of the problem. 
As kidnapping for ransom incidents are becoming increasingly transnational in character, 
the final section will look at the feasibility of formulating and agreeing upon regional 
standardised definitions and counting rules for kidnap. 
Introduction and Theoretical Background 
Kidnapping for ransom has a venerable past, with such famous historical victims as the 
biblical Joseph, Julius Caesar, Genghis Khan’s wife and Richard the Lionheart.  In the 
present, however, a lay person could be forgiven for thinking it a traumatic but infrequent 
crime, of concern only to a few famous or rich people – at least, if its relative low profile in 
national and international crime statistics is anything to go by.  In fact, kidnap for whatever 
reason is a crime that is committed against the highest in a society and the lowest, and can be 
motivated by a multitude of emotions including greed, political or religious principle, revenge, 
lust and even love.   According to American International Underwriters (AIU), kidnap is ‘…a 
growth industry throughout the world, and not just in 'high risk' countries’ (Borden, cited in 
Boyle, 2000, p1).  Economic extortive kidnapping, which is another name coined by Navia 
and Ossa (2003, p7) for kidnapping for ransom, may be seen by potential offenders as an 
opportunity for more lucrative returns and lower risks than other types of pecuniary crime, 
for instance, bank robbery.  According to Control Risk Group (CRG), over the last ten years, 
kidnapping incidents worldwide have been on the rise, with a 275 per cent increase on 
kidnapping of foreign nationals alone (Schinnerer, 2006, p1).  At the same time, high profile 
incidents such as the Abu Sayyaf kidnappings of tourists in Malaysia and the Philippines in 
2000 reveal that South East Asia has its own kidnapping hotspots to contend with.  Two 
feature films have been devoted to the activities of Hong Kong gangster, Cheung Tze-keung, 
who successfully kidnapped a business tycoon’s son for a record ransom of US$134 million 
(Asiaweek, 2001a, p2).  It is suspected that a high proportion of kidnappings are perpetrated 
by organised economic or political crime groups but it is not possible to estimate with any 
degree of accuracy what percentage can be attributed to organised crime (Williams, 2006). 
 
                                                 
∗ Sessional Lecturer / PhD Researcher, Graduate School of Business, Law and Social Sciences, Nottingham Trent University, UK.  
mohd.noormohamed@ntu.ac.uk  
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Redefining Organised Crime In Malaysia 
 
Associate Professor TEH Yik Koon,  Universiti Utara Malaysia 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In Malaysia, the authority and the public view organized crime as having the triad/gangster 
type of characteristics. As such, organized crime is basically seen to be committed by the 
Chinese community (triad groups) and the Indian community (gangster groups) at the local 
level. The authority has lately also recognized international organized crime committed by 
legal and illegal immigrants such as human trafficking, credit card fraud and trafficking of 
drugs.  
 
This paper intends to expand the definition of organized crime in Malaysia. The narrow 
definition adopted by the Malaysian authority and the public obscure the fact that organized 
crime can take place among respectable members of society, including the political elites. It 
has always been easier to label triads and gangs as organized criminals than respectable 
members of society for social and political reasons. However to omit cases involving 
respectable members of the society is to deny the existence of perhaps a more dangerous and 
damaging criminal activity.    
 
This paper will highlight the recent spate of “organized crime” committed by some members 
of the political elites in order to justify the expansion of the definition currently used by the 
Malaysian authority and the public.   
 
 
Introduction 
  
Academics and policy makers have been trying to define organized crime ever since the 
concept has been introduced in Chicago in 1919 by members of a civic association, the 
Chicago Crime Commission (von Lampe, 2002; 189). Some of the more recent definitions 
are as follows. 
 
In 2000, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime reported 
that: a) “Organized criminal group” shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, 
existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more 
serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, 
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit; b) “Serious crime” shall mean 
conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least 
four years or a more serious penalty; (c) “Structured group” shall mean a group that is not 
randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have 
formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure 
(United Nation, 2000; 1).  
 
The Council of Europe applies the following criteria when defining crime or criminal groups 
as “organised crime” (Council of Europe, 2005, 21):  
a) Collaboration of three or more people; 
b) For a prolonged or indefinite period of time; 
c) Suspected or convicted of committing serious criminal offences; 
d) With the objective of pursuing profit and/or power. 
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The Federal Bureau of Investigation (2007) defines organized crime as any group having 
some manner of a formalized structure and whose primary objective is to obtain money 
through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their position through the use of actual or 
threatened violence, corrupt public officials, graft or extortion, and generally have a 
significant impact on the people in their locales, region or the country as a whole. 
 
The Bundeskriminalamt (German Federal Police) reports that, “Organised crime is the 
planned commission of criminal offences determined by the pursuit of profit and power 
which, individually or as a whole, are of considerable importance and involve more than two 
persons, each with his/her own assigned tasks, who collaborate for a prolonged or indefinite 
period of time (Bundeskriminalamt, 2004; 15): 
a) by using commercial or business-like structures; 
b) by using force or other means of intimidation; or 
c) by exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, judicial 
authorities or the business sector.  
 
Courakis defines organized crime as “criminal activity systematically committed by a 
hierarchically structured team of criminals who do not hesitate to undermine State guidelines 
(such as those regarding corruption) and/or resort to violence in order to achieve their illegal 
aims” (Courakis 2001, 218). 
 
Gilinskiy defines organized crime as “the functioning of stable, hierarchical associations, 
engaged in crime as a form of business, and setting up a system of protection against public 
control by means of corruption” (Gilinskiy 2000, 4). He sees criminal associations as a kind 
of social organisation of a “working (labor) collective body” type. The growth of the 
organizational aspect of crime is a natural process, that is a manifestation of the growth of the 
organisational aspect of the social systems as well as of their subsystems. He goes on to say 
that, “G. Becker, the Nobel Prize winner in economics, speaks that criminal activity is as 
much a profession or trade as joinery, engineering or teaching. As an activity, crime is chosen 
when the profit (the revenue minus the costs of production) involved in it exceeds that which 
can be realized in legal occupations” (p.4). 
Von Lampe defined organized crime as “the planned commission of crimes for profit or 
power which by themselves or as a whole are of considerable relevance if more than two 
participants cooperate over a longer or undetermined period of time in a division of labour 
through the use of business or businesslike structures or through the use of violence or other 
means of intimidation or through the influence of politics, the media, public administration, 
the justice system or the economy” (von Lampe, 2001; 112). 
Siegel sees organized crime as a branch of enterprise crime (Siegel, 2006; 433). He defines it 
as ongoing criminal enterprise groups whose ultimate purpose is personal economic gain 
through illegitimate means. A structured enterprise system is set up to continually supply 
consumers with merchandise and services banned by criminal law, but for which a ready 
market exists; prostitution, pornography, gambling and narcotics. The system may resemble a 
legitimate business run by a chief executive officer, his or her assistants, staff attorneys and 
accountants with thorough, efficient accounts receivable and complaint departments.  
Organised crimes covers a wide range of activities. The better known activities include 
trafficking in drugs, trafficking in human beings, smuggling of persons, cybercrime, money 
laundering, extortion, property crimes, contraband smuggling and smuggling of arms. 
Different countries may also have their own local forms of organized crime, for example in 
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Malaysia, smuggling of petrol by big trucks across to Thailand was rampant in the last few 
years.  
 
It has been generally accepted by academics and law makers that defining organized crime 
has not been easy and perhaps there will never be a standardized definition due to the 
differences in geographical, historical, cultural, social, economic and political factors in 
different countries. Moreover, the criminal activities that organized criminals indulge in are 
always changing and adapting to new opportunities. As Dobovšek mentioned that it is very 
hard to measure organized crime in Europe because of  (Dobovšek, 1996): 
a) the different definitions of organized crime throughout Europe as well as in the world; 
b) the differences in judicial system; 
c) the differences in the police registration methods of organized crime; 
d) the differences in registration of criminal offences and of police activities. 
 
The Council of Europe 2005 report states that organised crime will remain an ambiguous 
concept (Council of Europe, 2005;19-20). Some of the reasons are that: 
a) It is a concept with a history which keeps changing over time. It is a social 
construction that reflects society’s perception at a given point in time and influenced 
by different political and institutional interests; 
b) Organised crime takes place in an ever changing environment and adapting to new 
opportunities, to resources and skills available to potential criminals as well as to law 
enforcement and other control efforts. It may take different forms in different 
societies; 
c) There are strong correlations between economic and organised crime and it may be 
more appropriate to consider organised crime as a subset of the broader category of 
economic crime; 
d) Organised crime is shaped by the social, economic and political context in which it is 
operating, with complex – more often symbiotic and clientelistic than 
confrontational – relationships between organised crime groups, state and society. 
e) With the paradigm shifting from a focus on hierarchical, “bureaucratic” organised 
crime groups with well developed structures, to criminal networks – which may take 
many different shapes, some of which are more permanent or even hierarchical, and 
others which are loose and fluid – it becomes extremely difficult to identify 
“structures” and thus organised crime in the conventional sense.  
 
However, academics have argued that although it is difficult to have consensus for the 
definition of organized crime, there is a need to have an operational definition or study 
framework that: a) can be used as a baseline to determine whether a group is engaging or not 
in organized crime; b) can stand the test of time; and c) is able to facilitate comparisons 
between different places. This operational definition is also important in guiding systematic 
research.   
 
Morrison suggested that a framework for the study of organised crime should incorporate a 
range of constituent dimensions, including: a) the environment in which organised criminal 
organizations thrive; b) the structures, demographics and relationships that characterise 
organised crime groups; c) the operational processes that organised criminals adopt; and d) 
the social, political, economic and environmental impacts of organised criminal organisations, 
particularly at the local level (Morrison, 2002; 5).  
 
Von Lampe said that an analytical model should, on the one hand, account for all dimensions 
of the problem that need to be considered, be they sociological, psychological, cultural, 
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economic or political (Von Lampe, 2003; 9). On the other hand, the model is designed to 
apply to all conceivable historical and geographical settings. The model should provide a 
conceptual scheme for the analysis of each and every case in its own right, but from a 
comparative perspective with the use of the same terminology, within the same broad 
conceptual framework and with the same research questions in mind. He said that any 
meaningful model of organized crime has to include six basic elements, three representing 
what has variously been labeled organized crime, and three elements representing 
environmental factors (p.6). The three core elements are: 
a) the actors who cooperate in rational, non-impulsive criminal activities; 
b) the structures that connect these actors; 
c) the criminal activities these actors are involved in. 
 
The three environmental elements are: 
a) society; 
b) government; 
c) and the realm of public discourse - the media. 
 
With the elements identified, there are three differentiations pertaining to the nature of 
criminal structures. The first differentiation is the forms and dynamics of criminal groups, 
organizations and networks. The underlying assumption is that a great deal of what is labeled 
organized crime involves the flexible use of personal ties for the commission of criminal acts. 
The second differentiation accounts for the fact that criminal structures can serve economic 
and non-economic functions. The third differentiation pertains to micro and macro structures 
within the sphere of illegality. There are criminal collectives that form out of economic or 
socio-cultural interests, and also, potentially, overarching structures that concentrate power in 
a given illegal market or geographical area. Following the distinction between economic and 
non-economic structures, these entities can be divided into two categories; illegal market 
monopolies and quasi-governmental ‘power syndicates’. 
 
The model can address two key questions: a) how patterns of criminal cooperation emerge 
and are transformed, and b) how within those criminal structures positions of power develop 
that are relevant for the criminal structures themselves and for society at large.   
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APPENDIX A:  CONFERENCE PROGRAM 
 
DAY 1    THURSDAY JUNE 28 2007 
 
8:30am – 8:55am Registration 
 
9:00am – 9:10am Opening Speech by GOH 
 
9:10am – 9:20am Welcome Co-Chairs A/P Lian Kwen Fee, HOD, Department of Sociology, 
NUS & Prof Roderic Broadhurst, HOD, School of Justice, QUT & Editor-in-
Chief of Asian Journal of Criminology 
  
9:20am – 10:00am Keynote: Prof Ko-lin Chin,  
Rutgers University, USA 
 
10:00am – 10:15am Q & A  
 
10:15am – 10:30 am Morning Tea Break - Faculty Lounge 
  
ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM  
 
10:30am – 11:00am Prof Michael Levi & Dr Nicholas Dorn 
Cardiff University, UK  
 
11:00am – 11:30am Prof Mark Findlay 
University of Sydney, Australia 
 
11:30am – 12:00pm Q & A 
 
12.00pm – 1.00pm Lunch – Faculty Lounge 
 
   DRUGS AND ORGANISED CRIME   
 
1:00pm – 1.30pm Prof Vincenzo Ruggerio 
Middlesex University, UK 
 
1.30pm – 2:00pm Dr Nicholas Dorn  
Cardiff University, UK  
 
2:00pm – 2.30pm Q & A 
 
RESPONSES TO ORGANIZED CRIME   
 
2.30pm- 3.00pm Prof. James Sheptycki 
   York University, Canada 
 
3.00pm – 3.30pm Dr Rebecca La Forgia & Dr Marinella Marmo,   
 Flinders University, Australia 
 
3.30pm. – 3.45pm Afternoon Tea Break - Faculty Lounge 
 
3.45pm – 4.15pm Mr. Keo Chhea  
ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia 
 
4.15pm – 5.15 pm  Q & A  
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DAY 2   FRIDAY JUNE 29 2007 
 
TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANIZED CRIME  
 
9:00am - 9:30am Prof Peter Grabosky, 
   Australian National University, Australia  
 
9:30am – 10:00am Dr. Choo Kim-Kwang Raymond  
   Australian Institute of Criminology 
 
10:00am - 10:30am Q & A 
 
10:30am - 10:45am Morning Tea Break – Faculty Lounge 
 
   COUNTRY PAPERS   
 
10:45am – 11:15am Dr Margaret Lewis, Research Fellow,  
   US - Asia Law Institute, New York University School of Law, USA 
 
11:15am – 11:45am Professor Thilagaraj 
   Madras University, India 
 
11:45am - 12:00pm  Q & A 
     
12:00pm – 1.00pm Lunch – Faculty Lounge 
 
1.00pm – 1:30pm Dr Lee King Wa, Centre for Criminology,     
   The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
 
1.30pm – 2.00pm Prof Shu-Lung Yang Institute of Criminology,    
    National Chung-Cheng University, Taiwan    
 
2.00pm – 2.30pm Prof Noriyoshi Takemura,      
    Toin University of Yokohama, Japan 
 
2.30pm – 3.00pm Mohd Kassim Noor Mohamed,      
    Nottingham Trent University  
 
3.00pm -3.30pm  A/P Teh Yik Koon  
   University Science Malaysia, Malaysia 
 
3.30pm – 3.45pm Afternoon Tea Break – Faculty Lounge 
 
3.45pm – 5.30pm Practitioners’ Roundtable 
 
5:30pm – 5.45pm Rapporteur’s Closing Remarks 
 
7:00pm – 9:00pm CONFERENCE DINNER  
 
  31
 
APPENDIX B:  ASEAN DOCUMENTS 
 
Asean Declaration on The Prevention and Control of Transnational Crime 
Manila, Philippines, 20 December 1997 
 
WE, the ASEAN Ministers of Interior/Home Affairs and Representatives of ASEAN Member 
Countries, participating in the first ASEAN Conference on Transnational Crime held in 
Manila on 18-20 December  
1997;  
CONCERNED about the pernicious effects of transnational crime, such as terrorism, illicit 
drug traffic king, arms smuggling, money laundering, traffic in persons and piracy on 
regional stability and development, the maintenance of the rule of law and the welfare of the 
region’s peoples;  
RECOGNIZING the need for clear and effective regional modalities to combat these forms 
of crimes, especially on the aspect of information exchange and policy coordination;  
RECALLING the Naples Political Declaration and Global Plan of Action of 23 November 
1994, which sought international solidarity and effective legal cooperation against these 
forms of crime;  
RECALLING FURTHER the Baguio Communiqué adopted during the first International 
Conference on Terrorism held in Baguio City, Philippines, on 18-21 February 1996, which 
endeavoured to enhance international cooperation against all forms of terrorism through such 
modalities as intelligence-sharing, coordinated policies and law enforcement training;  
NOTING the decision of the 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Jakarta in July 
1996 on the need to focus attention on such issues as narcotics, economic crimes, including 
money laundering, environment and illegal migration which transcend borders and affect the 
lives of the people in the region, and the urgent need to manage such transnational issues so 
that they would not affect the long term viability of ASEAN and its individual member 
nations;  
ENDEAVOURING to further the decision of the First Informal ASEAN Summit in 
November 1996 in Jakarta to request the relevant ASEAN bodies to study the possibility of 
regional cooperation on criminal matters, including extradition;  
PURSUANT to the decision of the 30th AMM in Kuala Lumpur in July 1997 which stressed 
the need for sustained cooperation in addressing transnational concerns including the fight 
against terrorism, trafficking in people, illicit drugs and arms and piracy;  
AFFIRMING the agreement among Heads of Government during the Second Informal 
Summit in December 1997 in Kuala Lumpur to take firm and stern measures to combat 
transnational crime such as drug trafficking and trafficking of women and children, as well as 
other transnational crime; and,  
CONVINCED that the continuity of existing global framework against transnational crime 
rests on consolidated regional action in the institutional and operational spheres:  
 
Have Resolved to Confront the Problem of Transnational Crime Through the Following 
Measures:  
1. Strengthen the commitment of Member Countries to cooperate at the regional level in 
combating the transnational crime;  
 
2. Convene at least once every two years ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational 
Crime in order to coordinate activities of relevant ASEAN bodies, such as the ASEAN 
Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD) and the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police 
(ASEANAPOL);  
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3. Hold discussions with a view to signing mutual legal assistance agreements, bilateral 
treaties, memorandum of understanding or other arrangements among Member Countries;  
 
4. Consider the establishment of an ASEAN Centre on Transnational Crime (ACOT) which 
will coordinate regional efforts against transnational crime through intelligence sharing, 
harmonization of policies and coordination of operations;  
 
5. Convene a high-level ad-hoc Experts Group within one year to accomplish the following 
with the assistance of the ASEAN Secretariat:  
a. ASEAN Plan of Action on Transnational Crime,  
b. Institutional Framework for ASEAN Cooperation on Transnational Crime, and,  
c. Feasibility study on the establishment of ACOT;  
 
6. Encourage Member Countries to consider assigning Police Attaches and/or Police Liaison 
Officers in each other’s capital in order to facilitate cooperation for tackling transnational 
crime;  
 
7. Encourage networking of the relevant national agencies or organizations in Member 
Countries dealing with transnational crime to further enhance information exchange and 
dissemination;  
 
8. Expand the scope of Member Countries’ efforts against transnational crime such as 
terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, traffic in persons 
and piracy, and to request the ASEAN Secretary-General to include these areas in the 
work programme of the ASEAN Secretariat;  
  
9. Explore ways by which the Member Countries can work closer with relevant agencies 
and organizations in Dialogue Partner countries, other countries and international 
organizations, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies, Colombo Plan 
Bureau, Interpol and such other agencies, to combat transnational crime;  
 
10. Cooperate and coordinate more closely with other ASEAN bodies such as the ASEAN 
Law Ministers and Attorneys-General, the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police, the 
ASEAN Finance Ministers, the Directors-General of Immigration and the Directors-
General of Customs in the investigations, prosecution and rehabilitation of perpetrators of 
such crimes; and,  
 
11. Strengthen the ASEAN Secretariat’s capacity to assist the Member Countries in initiating, 
planning, and coordinating activities, strategies, programmes and projects to combat 
transnational crime.  
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Asean documents on combating transnational crime and terrorism  
SIGNED this 20th day of December 1997 in Manila, Philippines.  
Dato Paduka Haji Abidin bin Orang Kaya Periwara Abd. Rashid  
Acting Minister of Home Affairs  
Brunei Darussalam  
Yogie S. Memet  
Minister of Home Affairs  
Republic of Indonesia  
Laoly Asang  
Minister of Interior  
Lao People’s Democratic Republic  
Dato Mohammad Tajol Rosli Ghazali  
Deputy Minister of Home Affairs  
Malaysia  
Tin Hlaing  
Minister of Home Affairs  
Union of Myanmar  
Robert Z. Barbers  
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government  
Republic of the Philippines  
Simon Tensing de Cruz  
Ambassador  
Embassy of the Republic of Singapore in the Philippines  
Xujati Boonto  
Charge d’Affaires  
Embassy of the Kingdom of Thailand in the Philippines  
Le Minh Huong  
Minister of Interior  
The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam  
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Manila Declaration On The Prevention And Control Of Transnational Crime (1998) 
Manila, Philippines, 25 March 1998 
 
Introduction  
 
1. The General Assembly, in its resolution 49/159, approved the Naples Political 
Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime (A/49/748, 
annex) adopted by the World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime, 
held at Naples, Italy, from 21 to 23 November 1994, and urged States to implement them 
as a matter of urgency. The General Assembly, in its resolution 51/120, requested the 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to consider, as a matter of 
priority, the question of the elaboration of an international convention against 
transnational crime. On the recommendation of the Commission, and the Economic and 
Social Council, the General Assembly in its resolution 52/85, decided to establish an 
inter-sessional open-ended intergovernmental working group of experts for the purpose of 
elaborating a preliminary draft of a possible comprehensive international convention 
against organized transnational crime, which would submit a report thereon to the 
Commission on Crime Preven tion and Criminal Justice at its seventh session. Pursuant to 
that resolution and thanks to the generosity of the Government of Poland, the meeting 
was held on 2-6 February 1998 in Warsaw (Poland).  
 
2. On the recommendation of the Commission, contained in draft resolution I adopted at its 
fifth session, the General Assembly adopted, by its resolution 51/59, the International 
Code of Conduct for Public Officials. By its resolution 51/191 of 16 December 1996, the 
Assembly also adopted the United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in 
International Commercial Transactions.  
 
3. Pursuant to the above-mentioned resolutions, the Asian Regional Ministerial Meeting on 
Transnational Crime was held at Manila from 23 to 25 March 1998 on the invitation of 
the Government of the Philippines.  
 
I.  Recommendations  
 
4. The Regional Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime unanimously adopted the 
Manila Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Transnational Crime, presented 
below.  
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Manila Declaration 
On The Prevention and Control of Transnational Crime 
Manila, Philippines, 25 March 1998 
 
We, Ministers and Representatives of the States participating in the Asia Regional Ministerial 
Meeting on Transnational Crime, held at Manila, Philippines, from 23 to 25 March 1998, 
organized by the United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention, with the 
Government of the Philippines acting as the Host;  
 
Assembled for the purpose of promoting regional and international cooperation to combat 
transnational crime and to devise modalities to improve the capacity of our countries to 
respond more effectively to the threats we are facing;  
 
Reiterating the importance of implementing the principles contained in the Naples Political 
Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime, as well as other 
pertinent United Nations instruments;  
 
Convinced of the need for effective national and regional action against transnational crime, 
particularly in view of its serious debilitating effects on democratic institutions, the 
maintenance of the rule of law and the development process;  
 
Mindful of the crucial importance of action against transnational crime, including organized 
crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, trafficking in human beings and various forms of financial 
crimes and corruption, and the need for appropriate legislation and regulatory measures, as 
well as of an efficient and fair criminal justice system;  
 
Conscious of the important role played by the United Nations in fostering international 
cooperation and developing practical strategies to prevent and combat transnational crime in 
all its forms and dimensions;  
 
Bearing in mind the Shizuoka Declaration of the Sixth Asia Crime Prevention Foundation 
Conference on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, held in Tokyo and Shizuoka, Japan, 
from 28 October to I November 1997;  
 
Bearing in mind also the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime of 20 December 1997 
which called for the expansion of the scope of the efforts of-member countries to combat 
transnational crime such as terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, 
traffic in persons and piracy, and the exploration of ways by which the member countries can 
work closer with relevant agencies and organizations, including the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies;  
 
Hereby declare:  
1. We recognize that organized transnational crime undermines civil society, distorts 
legitimate markets and destabilizes States. Criminal groups are creative in their 
endeavours in establishing alliances in the region and in other parts of the globe by taking 
advantage of gaps and weaknesses in international cooperation in criminal matters.  
 
2. We are concerned about the increase and expansion of organized criminal activities, such 
as trafficking in human beings, transnational exploitation of women and children, drug 
trafficking, trafficking in firearms and motor vehicles, illegal trade in cultural objects and 
natural resources including flora and fauna, money laundering and other forms of 
financial crimes and corruption.  
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We express our determination and political will to take concrete action by, among other 
measures:  
a) promoting national and regional action against transnational crime and corruption;  
b) developing effective strategies aimed at defeating the economic power of criminal 
organizations, dismantling their alliances and support networks and developing effective 
mechanisms capable of bringing members and leaders of criminal groups to justice;  
c) improving the functioning of our institutions, in particular the criminal justice systems, 
reviewing, modernizing and harmonizing, as appropriate, existing laws and regulations to 
ensure their continued relevance, efficiency and adaptability to modem manifestations of 
organized crime;  
d) enacting new laws and regulations, responding to the complexity and sophistication of 
various forms of transnational crime, so as to bridge the gaps in legal systems which can 
be exploited by organized criminal groups;  
e) strengthening the capacity of our law enforcement agencies and criminal justice 
personnel, and upgrading their skills through specialized training in the area of 
transnational crime, money laundering and other economic offences, including 
corruption, and the elaboration of the required training materials;  
f) implementing existing and developing new regional programmes aiming at the 
implementation of the various recommendations of the Naples Political Declaration and 
Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime,  
g) intensifying cooperation and coordination at the national level among relevant agencies to 
deal with various forms of transnational crime; and  
h) fostering close collaborative ties with international organizations, in particular Interpol 
and relevant non-governmental organizations.  
 
3. We also recognize that the Asia and Pacific region is witnessing rapid economic and 
political changes, together with advancements in communications and technology. These 
developments not only stimulate closer contacts with global markets, but also facilitate 
linkages between criminal organizations and allow joint criminal ventures. We note that 
the use and exploitation of computers and telecommunications technology for criminal 
activities have increased.  
 
4. We call upon States that are not yet parties to the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 to ratify or adhere 
to it without delay and to implement it fully.  
 
5. We realize that organized crime, drug trafficking, corruption and other economic crime 
generate large profits, which are used in illegal activities and to infiltrate legitimate 
businesses and financial enterprises, affecting negatively the development processes of 
our countries. It is therefore imperative that we prevent and control money laundering by, 
inter alia :  
a) developing modem and adequate investigation and information-gathering techniques 
to prevent criminals from manipulating and using the financial systems to disguise the 
origin of assets and funds, and developing complex structures that make detection 
unlikely and the collection of evidence difficult; and complementing this approach by 
actively encouraging and securing the cooperation of financial institutions and the 
business community through appropriate regulations and mechanisms;  
b) when appropriate, revising existing laws and regulations and enacting new laws, in 
order to integrate therein provisions on money laundering, in particular, those dealing 
with the extension of anti-money laundering measures to cover all serious offences 
and the reporting of suspicious transactions to appropriate authorities, combined with 
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effective implementation mechanisms to ensure prevention and control of the 
laundering of the proceeds of crime; and  
c) supporting the Global Programme Against Money Laundering, developed by the 
United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) and the Centre for 
International Crime Prevention, with a view to having cooperation activities with 
these entities to address the needs of the region in this field by paying particular 
attention to institution building and training of  personnel.  
 
6. We reiterate the view that corruption in various forms, including corruption and bribery in  
international commercial transactions, and their linkages with the various forms of 
organized crime undermine the values of democracy and morality and jeopardize the 
social, economic and political development of the countries of our region. Therefore, we 
confirm our commitment to combat all corrupt practices by, among other measures:  
a) developing prevention and control measures to promote a culture of accountability 
and transparency, with the active involvement and support of the public;  
b) developing comprehensive anti-corruption programmes, including administrative, 
civil, procedural and criminal legislation, as well as regulatory provisions and 
administrative action;  
c) putting into effect, as appropriate, the various provisions of the International Code of 
Conduct for Public Officials, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 
51/59, the United Nations Declaration on Public Security, adopted by the General 
Assembly in its resolution 51/60, and the United Nations Declaration against 
Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions, adopted by the 
General Assembly in its resolution 51/191 as well as the recommendations of the 
Expert Group Meeting on Corruption, held in Buenos Aires, 17 -21 March 1997, in 
order to strengthen national institutions and call attention, at national and international 
levels, to the need for addressing the problems of corruption and bribery.  
 
7. We note that the phenomena of corruption and bribery have become transnational in 
nature. Consequently, we encourage the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice, in accordance with its existing mandate, to examine the feasibility of a global 
convention against corruption and bribery, taking into consideration successful initiatives 
in this field, such as the 1996 Inter-American Convention against Corruption, adopted by 
members of the Organization of American States, and the Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, adopted in 
1997 by the OECD members and a number of non-OECD members.  
  
8. We are convinced that combating the above-mentioned forms of crime requires concerted 
action at all levels. As these crimes transcend national boundaries, international 
cooperation is essential, complemented by collaborative ties at the regional and sub-
regional levels. To that end, we are determined that our efforts should be focused on the 
following actions:  
a) creating the necessary infrastructures for regional and sub-regional cooperation of 
criminal justice institutions and law enforcement agencies to detect, investigate and 
effectively prosecute various forms of transnational crime with special emphasis on 
organized crime and corruption, taking full advantage of the experience of existing 
bilateral and regional arrangements; and  
b) intensifying the exchange of information and experience regarding the occurrence and 
patterns of organized crime and corruption, benefiting from best practices applied in 
different countries, and taking into account developments in the region.  
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9. We recognize the urgent need to make progress in vigorously promoting international 
cooperation in criminal matters. In this regard, we urge that special attention be given to 
extradition, mutual assistance, witness protection, transfer of prisoners, seizure and 
forfeiture of the proceeds of crime, as well as to other forms of regional and international 
cooperation in criminal matters. Towards that end we encourage focus on the following 
cooperation modalities, bearing in mind the differences in our legal systems:  
a) reviewing and updating our extradition and mutual assistance arrangements or 
agreements, or concluding such arrangements, as appropriate, so as to facilitate the 
application of extradition, mutual assistance and witness protection laws and practices 
among the countries of the region;  
b) in concluding bilateral or regional agreements, efforts should be made to include 
provisions on simplified extradition procedures, taking into account the need for each 
country to have its own extradition law and to respect safeguards contained in that 
law;  
c) establishing national central authorities to process requests for extradition and mutual 
assistance and putting in place mechanisms that would ensure coordination between 
competent national authorities; and  
d) making full use of the United Nations Model Treaties on International Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters when concluding bilateral, sub-regional or regional agreements or 
arrangements in this field, and taking full advantage of the expertise of the United 
Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice regarding modalities 
of cooperation in criminal matters.  
 
10. We welcome the results achieved by the inter-sessional open-ended intergovernmental 
group of experts on the elaboration of a draft international convention against organized 
transnational crime, which met in Warsaw, Poland, from 2 to 6 February 1998. We 
believe that the outline of options for contents of the convention serves as a solid basis for 
its further elaboration. We strongly support such an endeavor and confirm our 
commitment to play an active role in the efforts to resolve differences and overcome 
conceptual or substantive difficulties so that the process can move with speed towards its 
conclusion. We urge the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to take 
advantage of the existing momentum and the consensus achieved on the desirability of 
such a convention, with a view to speeding up the process of its drafting and finalizing 
such a project as soon as possible.  
 
11. We are convinced that, in order to achieve progress in combating the various forms of 
crime mentioned above, the capacities of our crime prevention and criminal justice 
infrastructures should be strengthened. Technical assistance and advisory services 
provided by regional and international organizations are essential for many of the 
countries in our region, particularly those which are undergoing economic hardships and 
do not possess the means to institute effectively appropriate reforms and changes.  
 
12. We believe that technical assistance should respond to the specific needs of the countries 
of the region and take account of the following issues:  
a) strengthening national capacities, including the creation of specialized structures 
capable of dealing with the complexity of organized crime;  
b) establishing arrangements for the systematic collection, collation and analysis of data 
on structures, functions and manifestations of organized transnational crime, 
including trafficking in human beings, money laundering and corruption, and using 
such data in the development and implementation of appropriate policies should be 
pursued;  
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c) exchanging information regarding legislative measures in order to assist in enactment 
of new legislation in response to newly emerging patterns of crime;  
d) organizing training courses and seminars for law enforcement and criminal justice 
personnel and developing training materials such as manuals and training curricula, 
with a view to upgrading their skills, promoting the exchange of experiences and 
know-how;  
e) developing and implementing bilateral, sub-regional, regional and international 
treaties on cooperation in criminal justice matters, drawing on the expertise of 
regional States and the United Nations; and  
f) ensuring that the sectors of society that may be involved in transnational crime by 
reason of poverty and similar circumstances be provided with effective and 
sustainable alternative sources of livelihood and/or provided with opportunities to put 
their talents to legitimate use.  
 
13. We recognize the important role played by the United Nations Centre for International 
Crime Prevention in providing technical assistance and advisory services. Its role in 
facilitating the creation of joint initiatives and the formulation and implementation of 
technical cooperation projects, involving not only the interested developing countries but 
also other interested countries and relevant agencies, should be enhanced, with a view to 
maintaining efficient criminal justice systems as an essential element of development 
efforts. The resources for the Centre should be strengthened in order for it to cope with 
the increased demand for technical assistance and advisory services.  
 
14. We also recognize the important role played by institutions and organizations in the Asia 
and Pacific region, such as the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) and the Asia Crime 
Prevention Foundation (ACPF) in assisting the countries of the region in this field.  
 
15. We recognize as well the important role of sub-regional organizations in pursuing 
initiatives focused on their geographic areas and in establishing inter-organizational 
coordination mechanisms to address the problem of transnational crime.  
 
16. We are convinced of the fact that building up the capacity of governments to effectively 
cooperate with each other in criminal justice matters, particularly in relation to combating 
organized crime and corruption, is a joint responsibility of developed and developing 
countries and relevant agencies.  
 
We therefore call upon countries, the United Nations Development Programme, the 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and other relevant international, regional and 
national agencies to give favourable consideration to technical assistance project 
proposals submitted to them by the Centre for International Crime Prevention on 
strengthening our national or regional capacities and creating the expertise required for 
the prevention and control of organized transnational crime and corruption. In this 
connection, and given the high priority attached by our Governments to these matters, we 
appeal to prospective donors to give favourable consideration to the further development 
and implementation of action plans contained in the project proposals, including the 
integration of the activities foreseen in such proposals in the national’ development plans 
of our countries and in the respective country programmes of UNDP.  
 
17. We express our determination to ensure proper follow-up to the pronouncements of this 
Declaration by undertaking the following:  
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a) encouraging our Governments to take the necessary measures, in accordance with 
their countries, respective legal systems, to implement the various provisions of the 
Declaration; and  
b) appealing to Governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations and relevant institutes, to assist the efforts of the countries of the region 
in their fight against transnational crime. 
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Asean Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children  
Vientiane, Lao Pdr, 29 November 2004 
 
WE, the Heads of States/Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the 
Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of 
Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of 
Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, members of the Association of the Southeast 
Asian Nations, hereinafter referred to as ASEAN,  
 
REAFFIRMING the Ha Noi Declaration of 1998 and the Ha Noi Plan of Action, which, 
among others, committed to intensify individual and collective efforts to address 
transnational crimes, including the trafficking in persons;  
EXPRESSING the urgent need for a comprehensive regional approach to prevent and to 
combat trafficking in persons, particularly women and children;  
ACKNOWLEDGING that social, economic and other factors that cause people to migrate 
also make them vulnerable to trafficking in persons;  
RECOGNIZING that the immorality and inhumanity of this common concern elicits the need 
to strengthen legislative, law enforcement and judicial responses to ensure deterrent action is 
taken against persons involved in individual or syndicated activities of trafficking in persons, 
particularly women and children;  
APPRECIATING that a successful campaign against the scourge of trafficking in persons, 
particularly women and children, requires continuing dialogue, exchange of information and 
cooperation among ASEAN;  
REAFFIRMING ASEAN’s unwavering desire to embrace the spirit behind the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its relevant protocols as it 
reflects the commitment of the Member States of the United Nations to prevent and combat 
transnational organized crime;  
REAFFIRMING through this Declaration a commitment to human development and security, 
and the improvement of the quality of life of the peoples of ASEAN;  
HEREBY DECLARE, to the extent permitted by their respective domestic laws and policies, 
to undertake concerted efforts to effectively address an emerging regional problem, namely 
the trafficking in persons, particularly women and children, through the following measures:  
 
1. To establish a regional focal network to prevent and combat trafficking in persons, 
particularly women and children, in the ASEAN region;  
 
2. To adopt measures to protect the integrity of their respective passports, official travel 
documents, identity and other official travel documents from fraud;  
 
3. To undertake regular exchange of views, information sharing on relevant migratory 
flows, trends and pattern, strengthening of border controls and monitoring mechanisms, 
and the enactment of applicable and necessary legislations;  
 
4. To intensify cooperation among our respective immigration and other laws enforcement 
authorities;  
 
5. To distinguish victims of trafficking in persons from the perpetrators, and identify the 
countries of origin and nationalities of such victims and thereafter ensure that such 
victims are treated humanely and provided with such essential medical and other forms of 
assistance deemed appropriate by the respective receiving/recipient country, including 
prompt repatriation to their respective countries of origin;  
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6. To undertake actions to respect and safeguard the dignity and human rights of genuine 
victims of trafficking in persons;  
 
7. To undertake coercive actions/measures against individual and/or syndicate engaged in 
trafficking in persons and shall offer one another the widest possible assistance to punish 
such activities; and  
 
8. To take measures to strengthen regional and international cooperation to prevent and 
combat trafficking in persons.  
 
All Member Countries reaffirm their commitment to accomplish the elements of this 
Declaration through maximum efforts by such appropriate instruments as may be necessary 
and consistent with their respective national laws and policies.  
 
ADOPTED by the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN Member Countries on this 
Twenty-ninth Day of November 2004 in Vientiane, Lao People’s Democratic Republic.  
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Asean Plan Of Action To Combat Transnational Crime 
Yangon, Myanmar, 23 June 1999 
 
A. BACKGROUND  
 
(a)   The Mandate for ASEAN Cooperation In Combating Transnational Crime  
 
One of the fundamental principles of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
as enshrined in the Bangkok Declaration of 8 August 1967 was “strengthening the foundation 
for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations.” ASEAN policies, 
plans, strategies and activities revolve around this principle. Transnational crime has the 
potential of eroding this central belief thereby affecting the political, economic and social 
well being of ASEAN. In recognizing the detrimental effects of transnational crime, ASEAN 
countries have taken concerted efforts to combat such crime since early 1970s.  
 
ASEAN’s initial efforts in combating transnational crime were focused on drug abuse and 
drug trafficking, the prevalent crime then, which affected the growth and vitality of ASEAN. 
With globalization, technological advancement and greater mobility of people and resources 
across national borders, transnational crime has become increasingly pervasive, diversified 
and organized. The region has to deal with many new forms of organized crimes that 
transcend national borders and political sovereignty such as terrorism, new types of drug 
abuse and trafficking, innovative forms of money laundering activities, arms smuggling, 
trafficking in women and children and piracy.  
 
The resolve of ASEAN’s Leaders in fighting illicit drugs, the prevalent transnational crime 
then, can be traced to the Declaration of ASEAN Concord of 24 February 1976. The ASEAN 
Leaders, in that landmark document, called for the “intensification of cooperation among 
member states as well as with the relevant international bodies in the prevention and 
eradication of the abuse of narcotics and the illegal trafficking of drugs.”  
 
Since then, all the ASEAN Summits have expressed concerns on narcotics abuse and illegal 
drug trafficking in the region. At the Fifth ASEAN Summit in December 1995 in Bangkok, 
the Leaders decided that “ASEAN shall further enhance cooperative efforts against drug 
abuse and illicit trafficking with special emphasis being given to demand reduction programs 
and information exchange and dissemination, with the aim of creating a drug-free ASEAN.”  
 
With transnational crime expanding in scope and becoming more organized, ASEAN’s 
Leaders have called for a comprehensive and coordinated approach in combating crime at the 
regional level. At the First Informal Summit in November 1996, the ASEAN Leaders called 
upon the “relevant ASEAN bodies to study the possibility of regional cooperation on criminal 
matters, including extradition.” At the Second Informal Summit in December 1997, they 
“resolved to take firm and stern measures to combat transnational crimes such as drug 
trafficking, trafficking in women and children as well as other transnational crime.”  
 
The ASEAN Leaders also adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020 at the Second Informal Summit 
which, among others, envisioned tile evolution of agreed rules of behavior and cooperative 
measures to deal with problems that can be met only on a regional scale, including drug 
trafficking, trafficking in women and children and other transnational crimes.  
 
The ASEAN Foreign Ministers have also called for closer cooperation and coordinated 
actions on tackling transnational crime among ASEAN1 countries- At the 29th ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Jakarta in July 1996, the Foreign Ministers recognized the 
  44
 
need to focus attention on such crimes as narcotics trafficking, economic crimes, including 
money laundering, environmental crimes and illegal migration. They “share(d) the view that 
the management of such transnational issues are urgently called for so that they would not 
affect the long-term viability of ASEAN and its individual member nations.” At the 30th 
AMM in Subang Jaya in July 1997, the Foreign Ministers “stressed the need for sustained 
cooperation in addressing transnational concerns including the fight against terrorism, 
trafficking of people, illicit drugs and arms, piracy and communicable diseases.” The Foreign 
Ministers, at the 3 1” AMM in Manila in July 1998 reiterated the need for enhancing regional 
efforts against transnational crimes, such as illicit drug trafficking, terrorism, money 
laundering, and trafficking in women and children. At the meeting, the Ministers also signed 
the Joint Declaration for a Drug-Free ASEAN to eradicate the production, processing, traffic 
and use of illicit drugs in Southeast Asia by the year 2020. 
  
The ASEAN Finance Ministers echoed the sentiments of the ASEAN Leaders and the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers on illicit drug trafficking when they signed the ASEAN 
Agreement on Customs at their inaugural meeting on 1 March 1997 in Phuket. The 
agreement, which apart from enhancing ASEAN cooperation in customs activities and 
expediting the early realization of AFTA, aims to strengthen cooperation in combating 
trafficking in narcotics and psychotropic substances, and will facilitate joint efforts in anti-
smuggling and customs control.  
 
(b) Other Significant Developments  
 
Recognizing the urgency to tackle transnational crime from the regional dimension, the 
Philippines hosted the inaugural Meeting of the ASEAN Ministers of Interior/Home Affairs 
on Transnational Crime on 20 December 1997 in Manila. Apart from presenting an 
opportunity for the Interior and Home Ministers to exchange views on the transnational crime 
situation in ASEAN, the meeting also reflected on the detrimental impact of such on the 
Member Countries and the need for enhanced regional cooperation in fighting the crime. The 
highlight of the meeting was the signing of the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime 
by the Ministers. The document reflected ASEAN’s resolve in dealing with transnational 
crime and its intention to work together with the international community in combating 
transnational crime.  
 
The Declaration also established the basic framework for regional cooperation on fighting 
transnational crime. Accordingly, the ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Transnational Crime 
was to convene once every two years to coordinate activities of relevant bodies such as the 
ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD) and the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police 
(ASEANAPOL). The Senior Officials Meeting Transnational Crime was to meet at least once 
in a year to assist the Ministers in accomplishing their task. The Declaration also outlined the 
following initiatives for regional cooperation on tackling transnational crime:  
 
1. Hold discussions with a view to signing mutual legal assistance agreements, bilateral 
treaties, memorandum of understanding or other arrangements among Member Countries;  
 
2. Consider the establishment of an ASEAN Centre on Combating Transnational Crime 
(ACTC), which will coordinate regional efforts against transnational crime through 
intelligence sharing, harmonization of policies and coordination of operations;  
 
3. Convene a high-level ad-hoc Experts Group within one year to accomplish the following 
with the assistance of the ASEAN Secretariat:  
(a)  ASEAN Plan of Action on Transnational Crime,  
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(b)  Institutional Framework for ASEAN Cooperation on Transnational Crime; and,  
(c)  Feasibility study on the establishment of ACTC  
  
4. Encourage Member Countries to consider assigning Police Attaches and/or Police Liaison 
Officers in each other’s capital in order to facilitate cooperation for tackling transnational 
crime;  
 
5. Encourage networking of the relevant national agencies or organizations in Member 
Countries dealing with transnational crime to further enhance information exchange and 
dissemination;  
 
6. Expand the scope of Member Countries’ efforts against transnational crime such as 
terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, traffic in person and 
piracy, and to request the ASEAN Secretary General to include these areas in the work 
programme of the ASEAN Secretariat.  
 
7. Explore ways by which the Member Countries can work closer with relevant agencies 
and organizations in Dialogue Partner countries, other countries and international 
organizations, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies, Colombo Plan 
Bureau, INTERPOL and such other agencies, to combat transnational crime;  
 
8. Cooperate and coordinate more closely with other ASEAN bodies such as the ASEAN 
Law Ministers and Attorneys-General, the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police, the 
ASEAN Finance Ministers, the Directors-General of Immigration and the Directors-
General of Customs in the investigations, prosecution and rehabilitation of perpetrators of 
such crimes.  
 
The ASEAN Member Countries also participated in the first Asian Regional Ministerial 
Meeting on Transnational Crime held on 23-25 March 1998 in Manila. The meeting was a 
follow-up to the Naples Political Declaration and Global Plan of Action Against 
Transnational Crime adopted at the World Ministerial Con ference on Organized 
Transnational Crime held in Italy in November 1994.  
 
The meeting culminated with the adoption of a Manila Declaration on the Prevention and 
Control of Transnational Crime. The declaration reflects the concerns of the participating 
countries, including ASEAN, on the increase and expansion of transnational crimes and 
outlines the approaches to be undertake, both at the national and regional levels, in fighting 
transnational crime.  
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B. OBJECTIVES  
 
(a) General Objectives  
 
The general objective of the Action Plan is to encourage ASEAN Member Countries to 
expand their efforts in combating transnational crime at the national and bilateral levels to the 
regional level. As espoused in the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime, the overall 
focus of ASEAN collaboration will be to strengthen regional commitment and capacity to 
combat transnational crimes which include terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, 
money laundering, trafficking in persons and piracy. This is in recognition of the fact that 
tackling transnational crime requires a concerted regional effort in view of its global 
dimension and pervasive nature. Besides, such efforts will assist in complementing and 
contributing to the national and bilateral efforts undertaken by Member Countries in 
combating such crime.  
 
(b) Specific Objectives  
 
The specific objectives of the Plan of Action are to urge the ASEAN Member Countries to:  
 
1. Develop a more cohesive, regional strategy aimed at preventing, controlling and 
neutralizing transnational crime;  
 
2. Foster regional cooperation at the investigative, prosecutorial, and judicial level as well as 
the rehabilitation of perpetrators;  
 
3. Enhance coordination among ASEAN bodies dealing with transnational crime;  
 
4. Strengthen regional capacities and capabilities to deal with sophisticated nature of 
transnational crime; and  
 
5. Develop sub-regional and regional treaties on cooperation in criminal justice, including 
mutual legal assistance and extradition.  
 
C. PROGRAMME OF ACTION/PRIORITIES  
 
In order to achieve the general and specific objectives, ASEAN Member Countries arc 
encouraged to:  
 
Information Exchange  
 
1. Improve the ASEANAPOL regional database so as to further facilitate sharing and 
analysis of critical intelligence information, such as wanted and arrested persons, “modus 
operandi”, syndicates, and maritime offences;  
 
2. Establish a regional repository to compile summaries of national laws of ASEAN 
Member Countries pertaining to transnational crime;  
 
3. Conduct typology studies to determine trends and “modus operandi” of transnational 
crime in the ASEAN region;  
4. Maximize the use of modern telecommunications technology in facilitating the exchange 
of data on, among others, criminals, methodologies, arrests, legal documents, requests for 
assistance, and ensure its restricted transmission;  
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5. Identify relevant contact persons in the policy, legal, law enforcement, and academic 
institutions of ASEAN Member Countries, and facilitate networking and lateral 
coordination among persons and agencies with similar functions;  
 
Legal Matters  
 
6. Work for the criminalization in ASEAN Member Countries of specific transnational 
crimes, such as illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, piracy, arms 
smuggling and trafficking in persons;  
 
7. Ensure the harmonization of relevant national policies among ASEAN Member 
Countries;  
 
8. Develop multilateral or bilateral legal arrangements to facilitate apprehension, 
investigation, prosecution, and extradition, exchange of witnesses, sharing of evidence, 
inquiry, seizure and forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime in order to enhance mutual 
legal and administrative assistance among ASEAN Member Countries;  
 
9. Study the possibility of creating a regional programme on witness protection;  
 
10. Coordinate with the ASEAN Senior Law Officials Meeting on the implementation of the 
ASEAN Legal Information Network System:  
 
11. Strengthen the mechanisms for effective protection of the integrity of travel documents 
and government control of the ingress/egress of transnational criminal personalities;  
 
12. Seek to ratify and support existing international treaties or agreements designed to combat 
transnational crime.  
 
Law Enforcement Matters  
 
13. Appoint Police Attaché or Police Liaison Officers, whenever feasible, in the capitals of 
ASEAN Member Countries;  
 
14. Develop programmes for joint tactical exercises and simulations;  
 
15. Develop an exchange programme among ASEAN officials in the policy, legal, law 
enforcement and academic fields;  
 
16. Implement measures to ensure the protection of judges, prosecutors, witnesses, and law 
enforcement officials and personnel from retaliation by transnational criminal 
organizations;  
 
17. Enhance cooperation and coordination in law enforcement, intelligence sharing, and in 
preventing the illegal trafficking and use of explosives, firearms, and other deadly 
weapons, as well as nuclear, chemical and biological materials.  
 
Training  
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18. Develop regional training programmes, and conduct regular conferences to enhance 
existing capabilities in investigation, intelligence, surveillance, detection and monitoring, 
and reporting.  
 
19. Exchange “best practices” of relevant institutions in ASEAN Member Countries involved 
in the combat against transnational crime, including transfer of technologies.  
 
Institutional Capacity-Building  
 
20. Establish the ASEAN Centre for Combating Transnational Crime (ACTC).  
 
21. Rationalize the institutional framework on ASEAN cooperation in transnational crime by 
making the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime the highest policy-
making body, with a supervisory role and consultative relations with relevant ASEAN 
institutions involved in the combat against transnational crime;  
 
22. Promote the efficient networking of relevant national agencies/ organizations in ASEAN 
Member Countries by creating inter-agency committees/task forces to enhance 
information exchange and dissemination;  
 
23. Strengthen institutional linkages with the various ASEAN mechanisms involved in 
combating trans national crime particularly the ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting, 
ASEAN Finance Officials Meeting, ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters, ASEAN 
Directors General of Customs, ASEAN Directors General for Immigration and ASEAN 
Chiefs of National Police.  
 
Extra-Regional Cooperation  
 
24. Seek technical assistance from ASEAN Dialogue Partners and relevant specialized 
agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations, particularly with 
regard to training and acquisition of equipment.  
 
25. Enhance information exchange with ASEAN Dialogue Partner, regional organizations,  
relevant specialized agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations, 
particularly towards the sharing of critical information on the identities, movements and 
activities of known transnational criminal organizations.  
 
26. Urge ASEAN Dialogue Partners not yet party to existing international treaties against 
organized transnational .crime, in its various forms, to accede to such agreements.  
 
27. Promote interest and support in the international community for ASEAN initiatives 
against transnational crime through the participation of ASEAN Member Countries and 
the ASEAN Secretariat in relevant international conferences.  
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D.   INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEFORK FOR ASEAN COOPERATION ON  
       COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME  
 
To strengthen and coordinate ASEAN collaboration in combating transnational crime and 
implement the Plan of Action, ASEAN Member Countries agree to the establishment of the 
following framework:  
 
(a) ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC)  
 
1. The ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime shall be the highest policy 
making body on ASEAN cooperation in combating transnational crime. It shall also 
coordinate activities of the relevant bodies such as the ASOD, ASEANAPOL, ASEAN 
Directors-General of Customs, ASEAN Directors General of immigration and the Heads 
of Consular Affairs of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs;  
 
2. It shall comprise ministerial level representatives of ASEAN Member Countries 
responsible for combating transnational crime and meet at least once in two years and 
informally in between when necessary  
 
3. The Chairmanship of the AMMTC shall be rotated in alphabetical order among the 
ASEAN Member Countries:  
 
4. The AMMTC shall approve the reports of the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational 
Crime (SOMTC), and the reports of ASOD, ASEANAPOL, ASEAN Directors-General 
of Customs, and ASEAN Directors-General of Immigration on matters pertaining to 
transnational crime and the Heads of Consular Affairs of the ministries of Foreign 
Affairs; and  
 
5. The AMMTC shall report to the ASEAN Summit through the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting (AMM).  
 
(b) Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC)  
 
1. The Meeting of ASEAN Senior Officials on Transnational Crime shall be convened at 
least once a year and before the AMMTC, with the chairmanship of the SOMTC 
coinciding with the chairmanship of the AMMTC;  
 
2. It shall implement policies and plans adopted by the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 
transnational Crime (AMMTC);  
 
3. It shall develop five-year work programmes to implement the ASEAN Plan of Action on  
Transnational Crime;  
 
4. It shall convene, as and when appropriate, ad-hoc working groups or task forces 
comprising experts to assist the SOMTC in carrying out its functions;  
 
5. It shall promote cooperation and coordination with other ASEAN bodies dealing with 
transnational crime such as the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD), the 
ASEAN Chiefs of National Police (ASEANAPOL), the ASEAN Directors-General of 
Customs and the ASEAN Directors-General of Immigration and the Heads of Consular 
Affairs of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs;  
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6. It shall seek measures to promote cooperation with international agencies dealing with 
transnational crime, including those of the ASEAN Dialogue Partners; and,  
 
7. It shall designate a national focal point/agency who is able to coordinate cooperation on 
transnational crime at the regional level as well as nationally  
 
(c) ASEAN Secretariat  
 
1. It shall assist the SOMTC in initiating, planning and coordinating activities, strategies, 
programmes and projects to facilitate regional cooperation in combating transnational 
crime;  
 
2. It shall assist SOMTC in formulating the Work Programme;  
 
3. It shall assist in exploring ways by which SOMTC can work closer with relevant agencies 
and organizations in Dialogue Partner Countries, other countries and international 
organizations, including the LJN and its specialized agencies, Colombo Plan Bureau, 
Interpol and such agencies, to combat transnational crime; And  
 
4. It shall assist in mobilizing resources and seeking technical assistance from international 
agencies and ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners.  
 
E. FUNDING STRATEGIES  
 
To implement priority projects under the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational 
Crime, the SOMTC with the assistance of the ASEAN Secretariat shall:  
 
1. Secure funding support for ASEAN programmes and projects to be implemented on a 
cost-sharing basis;and  
 
2. Develop resource mobilization plans in order to obtain funding from the ASEAN 
Dialogue Partners, international funding agencies and other sources. H.R.H. Prince 
Mohamed Bolkiah, the Chairman of the ASEAN Regional Forum, on behalf of the 
participating states and organization, issues the following statement: 
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Mou Between the Governments of Member Countries of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations and the Government of The People’s Republic Of China on Cooperation 
In The Field of Non-Traditional Issues 
Bangkok, Thailand, 10 January 2004 
 
The Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, (hereinafter referred to as 
“the Parties”);  
DESIRING to strengthen the friendly cooperation among the Parties;  
PURSUANT to the Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of 
Non-traditional Security Issues adopted on 4th November 2002;  
DETERMINED to deepen cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues among 
the Parties;  
Have agreed as follows:  
 
Article 1 
Objectives 
 
The Parties shall develop practical strategies in accordance with their national laws and 
regulations to enhance the capacity of each individual country and the region as a whole in 
dealing with such non-traditional security issues as trafficking in illegal drugs, people 
smuggling including trafficking in women and children, sea piracy, terrorism, arms 
smuggling, money laundering, international economic crime and cyber crime.  
 
Article 2 
Areas of Cooperation 
 
The Parties have identified the following fields of common interest for mid and long-term 
cooperation:  
 
1. Information Exchange  
 
a) shall, subject to their respective national laws and policies, exchange The Parties shall 
establish a compilation of their national laws and regulations pertaining to such fields 
as mentioned in Article 1;  
b) The Parties shall establish a collection of international conventions pertaining to such 
fields as mentioned in Article 1, to which they are parties, and a collection of bilateral 
agreements signed among them where appropriate;  
c) The Parties shall, subject to their respective national laws and policies, exchange 
intelligence on the non-traditional security issues referred to in Article 1; and  
d) The Parties information on special equipment and techniques applied in the 
prevention and investigation of the non-traditional security issues referred to in 
Article 1.  
 
2. Personnel Exchange and Training  
 
a) The Parties shall promote personnel contact and exchange among their law 
enforcement officers and experts;  
b) China shall organize workshops to promote exchange of law enforcement experiences 
among the Parties in combating terrorism, trafficking in illegal drugs, sea piracy and 
international economic crime;  
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c) China shall hold training courses to upgrade the level of capacity of each Party and 
the region as a whole in drug control, forensic sciences, immigration administration, 
road traffic control and the investigation of cyber crime. To ensure the quality of the 
training courses, China shall invite regional and international experts to give lectures; 
and  
d) The Parties shall promote exchange and cooperation among institutions.  
 
3. Law Enforcement Cooperation  
 
a) The Parties shall encourage and offer each other the fullest law enforcement 
cooperation possible in accordance with their respective national laws and on the 
basis of mutual respect for sovereignty,equality and mutual benefit; and  
b) The Parties shall promote cooperation in accordance with their national laws in such 
fields as evidence gathering, tracing of crime proceeds, apprehension and repatrition 
of criminal fugitives and return of crime proceeds; and encourage each other to enter 
into bilateral legal arrangements therein.  
 
4. Joint Research  
 
a) The Parties shall support the joint research by their experts and scholars in the field of 
non-traditional security issues, and share the results of research between them; and  
b) The Parties shall organize experts in relevant fields to provide short-term technical 
services and to make study tours.  
 
Article 3 
Implementation 
 
1. The Parties agree that the implementing agencies for this Memorandum of Understanding 
are:  
 
a) The ASEAN Secretariat in coordination with the relevant national agencies of the 
ASEAN Member Countries; and  
b) The Ministry of Public Security for the People’s Republic of China.  
 
The implementing agencies of the Parties shall determine through consultation the details, 
schedule and arrangements for the implementation of the cooperation provided in this 
Memorandum of Understanding, and shall serve as coordinators for such cooperation.  
 
2. ASEAN welcomes China’s participation in the existing ASEAN cooperation pertaining to 
the fight against transnational crime, including the ASEAN Action Plan on the Fight 
against Transnational Crime and its Work Program.  
 
3. The Parties shall hold meetings at working level once every year to exchange information 
on implementation of this Memorandum of Understanding, to brief each other on the 
progress of cooperation under various mechanisms, and to discuss the plans for future 
cooperation.  
 
Article 4 
Financial Arrangements 
 
1. Expenses of workshops and training courses organized by China in accordance with this 
Memorandum of Understanding shall be covered by the Chinese side, including meals, 
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accommodation and local transportation for the participants sent by ASEAN Member 
Countries during their stay in China and fees for inviting experts, while the expenses of 
international travel shall be covered by the sending Countries, except when it is agreed 
otherwise.  
 
2. Expenses incurred in the implementation of other cooperative activities in accordance 
with this Memorandum of Understanding shall be covered by the Parties through 
consultation.  
 
3. The activities mentioned in this Memorandum of Understanding shall be conducted 
subject to the availability of funds and personnel of the Parties.  
 
Article 5 
Confidentiality 
 
1. Information, document, data, equipment or technology received in accordance with this 
Memorandum of Understanding shall not be disclosed or distributed to any third party 
except to the extent as authorized in written form to do so by the country providing it.  
 
2. In the event of termination of this Memorandum of Understanding, the Parties have 
agreed that the provisions of this Article shall continue to apply.  
 
Article 6 
Suspension 
 
Each Party reserves the right for reasons of security, public order or public health to suspend 
temporarily, either in whole or in part the implementation of this Memorandum of 
Understanding, which suspension shall take effect immediately after notification has been 
given to the other Party through diplomatic channels.  
 
Article 7 
Revision and Amendment 
 
The Parties may request in writing a revision, amendment or modification of all or any part of 
this Memorandum of Understanding. Any revision, amendment or modification shall be 
mutually agreed upon in written form by the Parties and shall form part of this Memorandum 
of Understanding. Such revision, amendment or modification shall come into force on such 
date as may be determined by the Parties.  
 
Article 8 
Settlement of Dispute 
 
Any dispute or differences arising out of the interpretation/ implementation/ application of 
the provisions of this Memorandum of Understanding shall be settled amicably through 
consultation/ negotiation between the Parties without reference to any third party.  
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Article 9 
Entry Into Force, Duration and Termination 
 
1. This Memorandum of Understanding shall come into effect on the date of its signing and 
shall remain in force for a period of 5 years. Thereafter, it may be extended for additional 
periods subject to availability of funds and agreements of the Parties expressed by way of 
exchange of letters.  
 
2. Each Party may give written notice to the other of its desire to terminate this 
Memorandum of Understanding, of which termination shall be effective thirty (30) days 
after written notification has been given to the other Party. The termination of this 
Memorandum of Understanding shall not affect the implementation of ongoing 
activities/programs.  
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized by the respective Governments 
of the ASEAN Member Countries and the People’s Republic of China, have signed this 
Memorandum of Understanding.  
 
This Memorandum of Understanding is signed in Bangkok, Thailand, on the 10th day of 
January of the year Two Thousand and Four in two original copies in the English language.  
 
For ASEAN:  
ONG KENG YONG  
Secretary-General of ASEAN  
For the Government of  
the People’s Republic of China:  
TIAN QIYU  
Executive Vice-Minister  
Minister of Public Security 
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APPENDIX C:  TRIAD ACTIVITIES IN HONG KONG 
 
(A)  Organization Structure of Hong Kong Police 
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The Hong Kong Police has an establishment of over 27,000 officers to police this small but 
busy city. It is the only police agency in Hong Kong and is completely independent. Hong 
Kong enjoys a virtual total autonomy in policing.  
 
2. Hong Kong has adopted the UK judicial system since the 19th centaury, the power of the 
Hong Kong Police is therefore very similar to those in Commonwealth countries. 
 
3. The above diagram clearly depicts the structure of the senior management of the Hong 
Kong Police. 
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(B)  Organization Structure of Organized Crime & Triad Bureau (OCTB) 
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4. Organized Crime and Triad Bureau is the major bureau at the headquarters level in Hong 
Kong Police in tackling serious, organized crimes and triad activities. There are separate 
distinctive desk job for each of the 12 operation teams, which includes tackling triads 
from different regions in Hong Kong, syndicated bookmaking activities, cross-border 
crimes, human smuggling, firearm gangs, syndicated vice activities, etc. 
 
 
(C)  Charter of OCTB 
 
5. OCTB is only responsible for investigating the most serious and major cases requiring an 
extremely high degree of expertise. The nature of these cases is: 
 
a) Cases distinguished by the ingenuity of the criminals; 
b) Cases distinguished by the brutality used in the perpetration; 
c) Cases indicating a high degree of syndication or sophistication; 
d) Cases with territory-wide or transnational implications; and 
e) Triad cases falling within (c) and (d) above. 
 
 
(D)  Triad Situation in Hong Kong 
 
6. Triad Societies in Hong Kong are secret illegal organizations which engage in all kinds of 
illegal activities for profit and they thrive on fear and/or corruption.  
 
7. The Hong Kong Police is aware that HK triad members have links with criminals in Asia 
and Europe. However, actions against triads in the past were mainly conducted on a case 
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by case basis. It is imperative to have a strong intelligence network such as Interpol in 
order to support pro-active actions against identified syndicates and activities.  
 
  
(E) Origin of Triads 
 
 
 
 
8. The word “Triad” is an English designation for the sacred symbol of the societies, a 
triangle enclosing a secret sign derived from the Chinese character “HUNG” (洪), whilst 
the resulting symbol is symbolic of the triangular union of heaven, earth and man. 
 
9. Triads were originally secret societies formed in 1674 to overthrow the Qing Empire 
established by the Manchurians and restore the ethnic Chinese Ming Dynasty Regime.  
They were militants and commanded Martial Arts in order to lead rebellions. 
Traditionally, triads, patriots rather in the old days, expanded their power by working in 
collusion with temples, monasteries as well as gymnasiums to train and recruit fighters.  
 
10. Qing Dynasty withered anyway in the 19th Century and it was eventually overthrown in 
1911 in a revolution led by Dr. SUN Yat-sen which was supported by the triads in the 
Mainland and overseas.  Patriotism of some triad members began to perish when they 
failed to find any other noble goals to pursue and they gradually corrupted and turned into 
criminal groups and engaged in criminal activities. 
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(F)  Triad Structure: Traditional Vs Current 
 
Traditional Structure of a Triad Society
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Deputy
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Current Structure of a Triad Society
Treasurer
Chairman
Red Poles 
(Operation/Discipline )
Public Relations 
Officers
Ordinary Member
Blue Lantern (Not yet admitted as member, but 
verbally agreed to join a particular triad group)
 
 
 
 
 
11. A comparison of the traditional and current structure of Triad Societies reveals that the 
latter is much simplified.  In order to avoid police arrest of the most senior directorate 
members, the posts are normally held by mid-level but ambitious and upcoming officer 
bearers, who either by appointment or election hold the posts for two years. 
 
 
(G)  Active Triad Groups in Hong Kong 
 
12. There are 212 known triad societies in Hong Kong in 1960.  However currently there are 
only 52 in existence with 13 of them criminally active. 
 
The most active seven ones:   
a) San Yee On (新義安) 
b) Wo Shing Wo (和勝和) 
c) Wo Hop To (和合桃) 
d) Wo On Lok (和安樂) 
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e) 14K 
f) 14K Tai Huen 
g) Tai Huen (大圈China Mainlander) 
 
 
(H)  Income/ Activities of Hong Kong Triads  
 
13. Hong Kong triads nowadays mainly involve in the following illegal activities. 
 
(i) Extortion on 
 
• Decoration companies 
• Small Scale Public transportation routes 
• Markets / Hawkers 
• Shops, Construction Sites etc 
• Wholesale fish markets and vegetable markets 
 
(ii) Monopolising 
 
• Small public transportation routes 
• Movie production and 
• Entertainment industries (signing up actors/actresses, establishing production companies) 
 
(iii) Bouncership in  
 
• Licensed Premises inc. Bars & Karaoke, Nightclubs & Mahjong Schools 
• Parking Services 
 
(iv) Other illegal activates 
 
• Copyright infringed VCD/DVD Sales 
• Vice – prostitution, drug Trafficking & illegal bookmaking 
 
 
(I)  Hong Kong Police Strategies  
 
14. HK adopts a multi-dimensional & multi-agency approach, which focuses on:  
 
a) Legislations 
b) Police Enforcement Actions 
c) Education, Publicity & community support 
d) International Co-operation 
 
 
(a) Legislations 
 
SOCIETIES ORDINANCE 
 
15. Societies Ordinance was enacted in 1949 to abrogate all unlawful societies. Under the 
ordinance, all triad groups are deemed to be unlawful societies. A number of offences 
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related to memberships, management, possession of materials of a triad groups and 
holding & attending triad meetings are enacted under the ordinance. 
 
ORGANIZED & SERIOUS CRIMES ORDINANCE 
 
16. Organized & Serious Crimes Ordinance (OSCO) was enacted in 1994. It gives police 
greater investigation power, such as production order and restraint order. It also creates 
the notions of money laundering offence and confiscation of crime proceeds. In addition, 
enhanced sentencing is embedded in the Ordinance to strengthen deterrence effect.  
 
WITNESS PROTECTION ORDINANCE 
 
17. The Ordinance aims at ensuring the safety of witnesses & their relatives. It tools at 
providing witness protection, re-identification and relocation of witness, etc. 
 
(b) Police Enforcement 
 
18. The Hong Kong Police adopts the following enforcement strategies in tackling triad 
activities: - 
 
(i) Strengthen intelligence network 
(ii) Mounting undercover operations to neutralize criminal syndicates 
(iii) High profile enforcement patrols 
(iv) Gain support from the community 
(v) A multi-disciplinary approach, linking other government agencies 
(vi) Targeting triad income 
(vii) Joint operation & exchange of intelligence with other LEAs 
 
(c) Education, Publicity & Community Support 
 
19. Through education, publicity and community, Hong Kong Police gains a higher caliber in 
prevention and tackling triad activities. In general, they are as follows:  
 
• Education – police liaison officers deal with schools on possible triad problems 
• Publicity  - anti-triad campaigns, anti-triad pamphlets etc. 
• Community support – regular conferences with community/ district boards/ associations 
and joint programmes with NGOs.   
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(d) International Co-operations 
 
20. With the continuing spread of global unification, international co-operations are 
imperative in fighting cross-border and cross country triad activities. In this sense, the 
Hong Kong Police has established the following approaches: 
 
• Many overseas LEAs have liaison officers in HK 
• HK Police Liaison Officers permanently based in Lyon 
• Another Liaison officer based in Thailand 
• Overseas visits, conferences & training  
• Strengthen cooperation to tackle similar crimes and syndicates. 
• Enhancement of intelligence as intelligence led policing is vital in the neutralization of 
organized crimes. 
• Foster an environment that no matter where the criminals are located, they cannot get 
away from LEAs. 
• Displacement of problems will only benefit criminals. 
• Forums could be conducted in Asia Pacific Region and may be at Interpol level.  
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APPENDIX D: ENFORCEMENT FIGURES (HONG KONG) 
 
Illegal Gambling Enforcement Figures in Hong Kong (2003-2006) 
 
 
 
(A)  Amount of Cash / Betting Records Seized 
 
 
 
 Amount of Cash Seized HKD 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 
Bookmaking 
(Soccer) 
[Horseracing] 
833,930 
(350,160) 
[471,600] 
390,020 
(40,200) 
[55,090] 
123,918 
(0) 
[6,470] 
565,050 
(186,230) 
[362,340] 
 
 Amount of Bet on Credit Seized HKD 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 
Bookmaking 
(Soccer) 
[Horseracing] 
45,226,610 
(36,215,170) 
[7,691,440] 
40,420,840 
(21,070,180) 
[2,647,230] 
44,879,407 
(27,507,596) 
[6,314,550] 
169,471,640 
(129,296,770) 
[11,682,680] 
 
 
 
 
(B)  No. of Raids and Persons Arrested 
 
 
 Nos. of Successful Raids Nos. of Persons Arrested 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Bookmaking 
(Soccer) 
[Horseracing] 
76 
(53) 
[13] 
71 
(42) 
[9] 
68 
(24) 
[10] 
208 
(156) 
[21] 
136 
(88) 
[27] 
197  
(70) 
[15] 
152 
(37) 
[21] 
400 
 (270) 
[64] 
 
 
